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'IN LAND WE TRUST': THE ENDOROIS'
COMMUNICATION AND THE QUEST FOR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN AFRICA
Korir Sing' Oei A.* & JaredShepherd**
This article examines Communication 276/2003,
Centerfor Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group Internationalon behalf of the Endorois
Welfare Council v. Kenya, arguedbefore the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Endorois
Communication is one of the first indigenous rights claims
to be examined by an internationalbody after the adoption
of the United Nations Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
This article begins by placing the Communication
within the context of the international indigenous rights
movement. The authors then explore the Commission's historical use of Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charteron
Human and Peoples' Rights. The authors contend that the
Commission, while liberally deploying comparative jurisprudence from the European and Inter-American Human
Rights systems, failed to articulate the bounds and import
of Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter. Finally, the
authors propose that the Commission should have grafted
the United Nations Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples into its understanding of long-standing African
Charter rights through Articles 60 and 61. Despite the
* Abraham Korir Sing'Oei (LL.M, University of Minnesota Law School & LL.B
University of Nairobi Law School) works on conflict, rule of law and minority
rights issues in Africa. He is the co-founder of the Centre for Minority Rights
Development in Nairobi, Kenya.
** Jared Shepherd (J.D., University of Minnesota Law School; B.S., Missouri
State University) is currently a Law Fellow at the American Civil Liberties Union
of Alabama in Montgomery, Alabama. He is a former intern at Zimbabwe Lawyers
for Human Rights in Harare, Zimbabwe and The Advocates for Human Rights in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Special thanks to his family and friends for their support,
especially Jon Shepherd, Karen Shepherd, Justin Shepherd, and Jaclyn Collins.
Additionally, the authors would like to thank David Weissbrodt and Fionnuala Nf Aoblin of the University of Minnesota Law School and Laura Young of
The Advocates for Human Rights for their guidance and support.
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Commission's significantfinding that Kenya violated the
rights of the Endorois Community, the authors conclude
that the Commission missed an opportunity to declare that
the Charter'srights are only adequately applied to indigenous populations, through the framework of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

INTRODUCTION

In 1974, the government of the Republic of Kenya ordered the Endorois community out of their ancestral land in the Lake Bogoria area.1 The
government, without consulting the group, gazetted their land as a wildlife
reserve, and promised the Endorois compensation. The government never
fulfilled its promise. Instead, it continued to deny the community access to
their pristine pasturelands while subjecting its leaders to harassment, arbitrary arrests and intimidation. 2
The Endorois Community's case,' argued before the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission),4 is the product of the community's sustained campaign for recognition of their identity
and restoration of their ancestral land. In its Decision on the Merits, the
African Commission found that Kenya violated Articles 1, 8, 14, 17, 21,
1 Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) on behalf of the Endorois Community v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/2003, T 9-17, Afr. Comm'n on
Human & Peoples' Rights (2006) [hereinafter Endorois Communication] (on file
with the authors).
See Bill Rutto & Korir Sing'oeie, The Endorois and their Lost Heritage, in
INDIGENOUs AFFAIRs 47, 49 (2004), available at http://www.iwga.org.
3 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1. The Commission issued its decision in July 2009. Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) on behalf of the Endorois Community v. Kenya, Comm.No. 276/2003, Afr. Comm'n on
Human & Peoples' Rights (2009) [hereinafter Endorois Decision]. The African

2

Union adopted the African Commission's Decision.
The African Commission on Human and People's Rights (African Commission) is a creature of article 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights (African Charter) and is composed of "eleven members chosen from
amongst African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples'
rights; particular consideration being given to persons having legal experience."
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 31, OAU Doc.CAB/
LEG/67/3rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter].
4
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and 22 of the African Charter.5 The Endorois Communication and the African Commission's Decision on the Merits provide an opportunity to examine indigenous rights in Africa against ongoing developments in
contemporary international human rights law. 6 Specifically, the Communication provides an opportunity to examine the utility of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a tool for the co-realization of the States' and indigenous communities' rights to development and
natural resources in Africa. Furthermore, the Endorois case provided the
African Commission with an ideal case to elaborate and clarify the group
rights provisions of the Charter.7
This paper addresses two interrelated questions. First, it discusses
whether the Endorois Communication enhances the understanding and recognition of indigenous peoples' rights in Africa. Second, it assesses
whether the African Commission capitalized on the opportunities afforded
it to deepen the development of indigenous peoples' rights on the content.
Part I reviews the Endorois litigation at national courts in Kenya and its
ultimate seizure, admissibility, and hearing by the African Commission.
Part II analyzes the relevant human rights issues raised by the Endorois
claim at the African Commission. Consequently, it also highlights the contentious issues surrounding indigenous rights in international human rights
law.
Part III frames the Endorois Communication as an opportunity
presented to the African Commission to accelerate its standard setting
processes on indigenous rights in tandem with international developments.
The paper advocates the Commission's greater utilization of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to expound on the
African Charter's rights to development and natural resources beyond a
mere comparative framework. Specifically, the paper examines how the Af-

5 Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at 80. The Endorois alleged violation of five
African Charter rights, namely: Article 8 (right to free practice of religion); Article
14 (right to property); Article 17 (cultural rights); Article 21 (right to free disposition of natural resources); and Article 22 (right to development). See African Charter, supra note 4. The African Commission affirmed the Endorois' claims. In
addition, the Commission found a violation of Article 1,essentially finding a failure of the state to adopt legislative measures to protect the enumerated rights. Article I states, "The Member States of the Organization of African Unity, parties to
the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this
Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to
them." African Charter, supra note 4, art. 1.
6
7

See Endorois Decision, supra note 3.
See African Charter, supra note 4, arts.19-24.
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rican Commission should have brought the Declaration into Africa's expanding human rights system through articles 60 and 61 of the Charter.8

II.
A.

THE ENDOROIS COMMUNICATION:

AN OVERVIEW

The Claim in Kenyan Courts

The Endorois are the traditional inhabitants of the Lake Bogoria
area within Kenya's Rift Valley Province.9 The community numbers approximately 400 families and is a sub-group of the larger Kalenjin speaking
ethnic group. These families practice pastoralism. The Endorois graze their
animals near Lake Bogoria during the rainy seasons and move to the
Monchongoi forest in the dry seasons. The Endorois depend upon their livestock for survival. The fertile land surrounding Lake Bogoria provides
green pastures and medicinal salt licks vital for their livestock's health. Ad8 An African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights has recently been established
to bolster the African Commission's protective mandate under the African Charter.
See Protocol To The African Charter On Human And People's Rights On The
Establishment Of An African Court On Human And Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc.
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (June 9, 1998), available at http://www.
achpr.org/english/-info/court en.html. See also United Nations DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, G.A. RES. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295
(SEPT. 13, 2007) [hereinafter DECLARATION].
9 Others question this assertion and argue that the Endorois are not a distinct

group but only a sub-group of the Tugen community in Baringo. See, e.g., Response of Kenya Government, 1.1.5 (July 31, 2006) [hereinafter Kenya Response]. See also Bill Rutto & Korir Sing'oeie, The Endorois and their Lost
Heritage, 4 INDIGENOUs AFFAIRS 47, 49 (2004). This paper adopts the prevalent
self-identification standard reflected in several international human rights instru-

ments, most specifically: ILO Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. See ILO Decision, infra note 57;
Declaration, supra note 8. The Endorois' perception of distinctiveness, therefore,
serves as the legitimate basis for their identification as a unique indigenous community. See S. James Anaya. & Claudio Grossman, The Case of the Awas Tingni v
Nicaragua:A New Step in the InternationalLaw of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZONA J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (the classification of the Awas Tingni of Nicaragua as a
sub-group of the larger Mayagna or Sumo group did not negate their indigenous
rights claims before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights); see also Yakye
Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Case 12.313, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 125/05,
OEA/Ser.C/125 1 82 (2005) [hereinafter Yakye Axal. Notably, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights holds the recognition of juridical personality by a state of
its indigenous peoples is a mere formality because indigenous rights do not stem
from state recognition of the legal status of an indigenous community.
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ditionally, Lake Bogoria is essential to the community's religious and cultural practices.
The Endorois community's battle over their ancestral land commenced on the heels of Kenya's independence in 1964. By adopting the
colonial land and natural resource regime unchanged, Kenya's post independence state presented unique problems to semi-nomadic communities,
including the Endorois. For example, the Colonial government promulgated
the Native Trust Lands Ordinances in 1939, creating two separate property
domains.' 0 The first regime, "Crown Land," constituted radical title over
all 'waste and unoccupied land' and vested it in the colonial sovereign."
The second regime, "Native Areas," vested ultimate control of all other land
actually occupied by African communities in a Native Lands Trust Board
which sat in London. Under the Native Trust Lands Ordinance, the British
government demarcated each recognized ethnic group's "native land
area,"' 2 and allowed it to be governed under customary tenure. At independence, radical title to these native reserves was transferred to the local authorities (County Council), obliged to hold the land in trust for the use and
benefit of the local community. 3 Notably, most lands occupied by no-

1o

See H. W.O. OKOTH-OGENDO, TENANTS OF THE CROWN: EVOLUTION OF AGRARIAN LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN KENYA 10 (1991).
" The legal designation of African territory as "waste and unoccupied land" is
rooted in the internationally notorious concept of terra nullius or vacant land,

which was behind European annexation of territory in new lands, including Africa.
The validity of the doctrine of terranullius, however, is now discredited. See, e.g.,
Western Sahara Case (Advisory Opinion) 1975 I.C.J No.61, at 86 (Oct. 16). The
Court held that "the concept of res nullius, employed at all periods, to the brink of
the twentieth century, to justify conquest and colonization, stands condemned."
12 The land discussed in the Endorois communication is classified as part of the
Suk, Kamasia, Marakwet, Elgeyo and Njems Native Reserve.
13 See CONSTITUTION, Chapter IX, § 115(1) (1992) (Kenya). The Constitution provides: "All Trust land shall vest in the county council within whose area of jurisdiction it is situated." Section 115 (2) also provides: "Each county council shall hold
the Trust land vested in it for the benefit of the persons ordinarily resident on that
land and shall give effect to such rights, interests or other benefits in respect of the
land as may, under the African customary law for the time being in force and
applicable thereto, be vested in any tribe, group, family or individual." These provisions excluded water masses and mineral deposits from the general control of
local authorities. This section also subjected the application of African customary
law to statutory law as well as the dictates of public morality and health. Kenya's
Trust doctrine has dubious foundations in paternalism. One political unit is viewed
to lack the capacity to fully manage its own affairs is subjected to some measure of
supervision and control by a higher authority. For instance, colonization of Africa
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madic communities in Kenya-the sites of most national parks and
reserves-are held under the Trust Lands Act.14 This guardianship relationship is often abused by the central government, which colludes with local
authorities to convert trust lands into private land or to utilize for national
development priorities in total disregard of the needs of local communities.
Calestus Juma indicts the state's conception of public trust:
One of the main problems with the Kenya constitution is
that it articulates the notion of public trust in such a way
that it works against local communities. The constitutional
provisions and laws pertaining to trust lands, for example,
have worked expressly against the interest of trust lands
inhabitants. '5
The Endorois community first launched their campaign in Kenya's
domestic courts, challenging the manner in which the Baringo and Koibatek
County Councils-the joint trustees of the Lake Bogoria land-managed
and controlled the game reserve.' 6 Specifically, the community questioned
the allocation of revenue collected from the park, which left the community
out of the profit structure. The Community also challenged the legality of
their eviction from the park. Furthermore, the Community contended that
the government abridged their constitutional rights by denying them access
to grazing land, cultural and religious sites.' 7
was predicated on the principle that colonial powers would "watch over the preservation of native population and the improvement of the conditions of the moral and
material well being." General Act of the Berlin Conference, art. 6, Feb. 26, 1885,
reprintedin 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 12 (Supp. 1909). The League of Nations internationalized and legitimized trusteeship as a sacred trust that civilization owed to
those "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions
of the modem world." Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 22, para.1.
14 See Joseph Kieyah, Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights in Kenya: a CaseStudy of
the Maasai and Ogiek People, 15 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 397, 414 (2007).
15 Calistaus J., Private Property, Environmental and Constitutional Change, in
CALISTUs JUMA &
16

J. B.

OJWANG, IN LAND WE TRUST,

374 (1996).

William Ngasia and Others v Baringo County Council and Others, High Court

Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 183 of 2000. The Endorois filed this application in
the High Court, seated in Nakuru, under section 84 of the Kenyan Constitution.
Justice David Rimita granted leave on July 1, 1999 and Miscellaneous Civil Case
No. 183 of 2000 proceeded to the High court of Kenya at Nakuru on Aug. 19,
2000. The High Court heard the case on Aug. 19, 2000, and delivered the judgment on April 19, 2002. Endorois Communication, supra note 1,at 1 98.
17

Id.
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The Kenyan High Court dismissed the Endorois claim upon a finding that, "the law does not allow individuals to benefit from such a resource
simply because they happen to be born close to the natural resource." 8 The
court failed to engage the broader issues raised by the Endorois claim. In
particular, it failed to assess the scope of duties on the State under the Trust
Lands Act or the corresponding rights of communities governed by the statute. 19 Additionally, the court failed to clarify whether the procedural requirements under the Trust Land Act were complied with nor addressed
what human violations had resulted from the community's forced eviction.
The Endorois community appealed the High Court judgment, but
uncertainty as to a right of appeal 20 and the sheer inefficiency of the Kenyan
2
court system conspired to deny the community further national remedies. 1
Consequently, the Endorois sought redress at the African Commission. The
Endorois placed their claim solidly within the protective jurisdiction of the
African Commission by a Letter of Intent forwarded in May 2003 and an
Admissibility Petition submitted in August 2003.22 The crux of the Endorois claim at the Commission is that the Kenyan state breached the African Charter through violations of their rights to property, culture, religion,
natural resources and development.

18

Id.

The African Commission's Decision on the Merits took note of the High
Court's position that it could not "address the issue of a community's collective
right to property" and "that it did not believe Kenyan law should address any special protection to a people's land based on historical occupation and cultural rights.
Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at 12.
20 The Kenyan Constitution provides for a right of appeal "against determinations
of the High Court . . . as of right." Supra note 13, at §84 (7). This section of the
Constitution was introduced in 1997 as an amendment to the Constitution of Kenya, effectively overruling common law decisions, such as Anarita Karimi Njeru v
The Republic (1979) 1 K.L.R 162 (Kenya), which had suggested that there was no
right of appeal. Even with this amendment, the courts were still reluctant to consider appeals on human rights issues.
21 In Kenya, court proceedings are hand written and have to be typed after judgement is issued. The aggrieved party must request a copy and pay the cost. No
certified copies of proceedings in relation to the Endorois high court case were
prepared until two years after the Notice of Appeal was lodged, which effectively
froze any possible appeal. CEMIRIDE on behalf of the Endorois Community v.
Kenya, (Submissions on Admissibility), Comm. No. 276/2003, T 5, 16.5, Afr.
Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rts. [hereinafter Admissibility Submissions].
22 Articles 47 (interstate complaints) and 55 (other communications) of the African Charter are the sources of the African Commission's protective jurisdiction.
African Charter, supra note 4, arts. 47, 55.
'
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B. The Endorois Address the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights
1.

Procedural Requirements

Every claim before the African Commission must satisfy the mandates of Article 56 of the Charter. 2 3 Groups self-identifying as indigenous
communities have struggled to satisfy the requirements of Article 56. Two
recent communications on indigenous rights were deemed inadmissible
under Article 56.24 The Endorois Communication had to circumvent two
Article 56 outlines the admissibility requirements of a Communication.
provides:
23

It

Communications . . .shall be considered if they:

1. Indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity,
2. Are compatible with the Charter of the Organization of African Unity or with the present Charter,
3. Are not written in disparaging or insulting language directed
against the State concerned and its institutions or to the Organization of African Unity,
4. Are not based exclusively on news discriminated through the
mass media,
5. Are sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is
obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged,
6. Are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local
remedies are exhausted or from the date the Commission is
seized of the matter, and
7. Do not deal with cases which have been settled by these States
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity or the provisions of the present Charter.
African Charter, supra note 4, at art. 56.
24 See, e.g., Anuak Justice Council v Ethiopia, Comm. No. 299/03, Afr. Comm'n
on Humand & Peoples' Rights, (2006); Bakweri Lands Claims Committee v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 260/02, Decision, Afr. Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights,
(2004). In particular, consideration of the Bakweri Communication would have
raised serious issues. That complaint was the first time the Commission was seized
of a complaint by an indigenous minority group over land once considered terra
nullius rights (unoccupied land). If the Communication was admissible, the Commission would have had the rare opportunity to pronounce on one of the most
contentious but yet unresolved issues from Africa's painful colonial past. For a
greater discussion, see Ndiva Kofele K., Asserting Permanent Sovereignty Over
Ancestral Lands: The Bakweri Land Litigation Against Cameroon, 13 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP. L. 107 (2007).
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significant procedural hurdles arising from Article 56: the retroactivity prohibition and the exhaustion of local remedies.
State obligations under the African Charter, like in other treaties,
arise only upon ratification. 25 Due to the fact that the Endorois claim first
arose in 1973 before the African Charter's adoption and Kenya's subsequent ratification, the Endorois relied on an exception to the retroactivity
prohibition rooted in the continuing nature of the violation. 26 In order to
bypass the exhaustion of local remedies requirement, the Communication
premised admissibility on two recognized exceptions to this rule: the substantial nature of the violations, 27 and the non-existence of "effective, available and efficient" remedies within the Kenyan legal system. 28 The Kenyan
government argued that a domestic appeal of the Endorois' constitutional
application was not concluded and, therefore, forestalled the Community's
ability to approach the Commission. 29 The Commission, however, deemed
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 11, 115 U.N.T.S. 331(1980);
see African Charter, supra note 4. Kenya ratified the treaty on February 21, 1992.
26 See, e.g., Annette Pagnoulle (on behalf of Abdoulaye Mazou) v. Cameroon,
Comm. No. 39/90, § 15, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights. In addition
to previous Commission cases, the Endorois relied on comparative support from
Hopu and Bessert v Franc, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 70, U.N. Doc.
A/52/40 (1997); see also Admissibility Submissions, supra note 21, at 1 20.6. See
also Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H. R. 513, 525 (1996) (where Court recalls its
endorsement of the notion of a 'continuing violation' of the Convention and its
effects as to temporal limitations of the competence of Convention organs).
27 See, e.g., Free Legal Assistance Group, et. al. v Zaire, Comm. No. 25/89,
37,
Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights (1995):
25

The Commission has never held the requirement of local remedies to apply literally in cases where it is impractical or undesirable for the complainant to seize the domestic courts in the case
of each violation. This is the situation here, given the vast and
varied scope of the violations alleged...
28 See Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, Comm. No. 215/1998,
32,Afr.
Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights (2008) (noting that "[a] remedy is considered available if the petitioner can pursue it without impediment, it is deemed effective if it offers a prospect of success and it is found sufficient if it is capable of
redressing the complaint.") (emphasis added).
29 The Kenyan government grounded its objection on the principle of exhaustion
of local remedies expressed in the Ambatielos claim: "The defendant State has the
right to demand that full advantage shall have been taken of all local remedies
before the matters in dispute are taken up on the international level by the State of
which the persons alleged to have been injured are nationals." The Ambatielos
Claim (Greece v U.K.) 12 R.Int'l Arb. Awards 83 (Comm'n of Arb.1956). To the
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the Communication admissible, relying on the belief that the resolution of
such an appeal, would fail to be effective. Presumably, the Commission
noted that the notion of collective property rights is not recognized within
Kenya's bill of rights. 30
From the outset, the Commission sought to secure a friendly settlement of the claim without success. 3 ' The Commission sees its principal
objective as creating a dialogue between the parties in order to amicably
settle disputes. 32 This position takes into account its lack of mechanisms
for securing compliance with its decisions. 33 The Commission's granting of
provisional measures was a positive step in the process at Abuja. The govKenyan government's disadvantage, however, the same case presents an exception
to this rule, namely "[that] remedies which could not rectify the situation cannot be
relied upon by the defendant State as precluding an international action." Id.
30 The Endorois asserted that the Bill of Rights in Kenya's Constitution was modelled along the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. The Submissions on Admissibility stated, in pertinent part:
"[By] the fact that the 1950 European Convention rests on a highly individualistic
conception of society it is unsurprising that Chapter V of the Constitution of Kenya
does little to protect the concept of group or collective rights in the sense asserted
by the Applicants." Admissibility Submissions, supra note 21, at 1 17.4. See also
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, (Sept. 3, 1953), as amended by Protocol Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 entered
into force on Sept. 21,1970, 20 Dec. 20 1971, Jan. 11990, and Nov. 1,1998 [hereinafter European Convention]. For further discussion on the individualistic nature of
the European Convention, see Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319,
328.
31 A meeting on August 24-26 2006, between representatives of the Kenyan government and the Endorois Community failed to yield any friendly settlement in
terms requested by the Commission. (on file with authors).
32 El Hadj Boubacar Diawara v. Benin, Comm. No. 18/88,
35 Afr. Comm'n on
Human & Peoples' Rights (1988) (noting "It is the primary objective of the Commission in the communications procedure to initiate dialogue between the parties
which will result in an amicable resolution to the satisfaction of both and which
remedies the prejudice complained of."). See also Rules of Procedure of the Afr.
Commission, Oct. 6, 1995, Res. ACHPR/RP/XIX, Rules 88-92 (Oct. 6,
1995)[hereinafter Rules of Procedure].
292. The Inter-American
33 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at
Court has ruled for restitution of ancestral territory to indigenous groups, including
demarcation. See Case of the Mayagna (SUMO) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua,
Case No. 11.577, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,(Ser. C.) (2001). CERD recognizes the right
to just, fair, and prompt compensation for violation of indigenous land rights. See,
e.g., General Recommendations, XXIII, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
A/52/18, (1997), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Rec-
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ernment of Kenya halted the mining of red rubies on Endorois land in accordance with the Commission's order. Upon petition of the applicant, the
Commission is empowered to mandate the maintenance of the status quo
with respect to disputed land.34
3.

Remedies Sought at the Commission

While the Endorois sought a formal Declaration that their rights
were violated, their main prayer was for restitution of their ancestral land,
without which their culture and religion stand in jeopardy.3 5 The Endorois
stressed that the land should be secured through demarcation and the issuance of collective title to the community. 36 In addition, the Community
ommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/
Rev.6, (2003) [hereinafter General Recommendations].
34 Makau W. Mutua, The Construction of the African Human Rights System:
Prospectsand Pitfalls, in REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS: MOVING FROM INSPIRATION
TO IMPACT 143, 151 (Samantha Power & Allison T. Graham eds., 2000) (discussing recent developments at the Commission, including the adoption by the Commission at its 40th session (November 2006) of Resolution on the Importance of
Implementation of the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights obliging states to report on measures taken and constraints
encountered within 90 days of notification of decision, point to increasing possibilities for enhanced implementation).
5 See Letter from the Chair of the African Commission on Human and Peoples
Rights to His Excellency Mwai Kibaki, President of the Republic of Kenya (Dec.
9, 2004) (on file with author). While the African Charter does not provide for
Provisional measures, Rule 111 of its procedure has been utilized as an interpretive
mechanism in other situations. The binding character of provisional measures in
international law, however, remains contentious. The Commission, in another unprecedented move, allowed the introduction of video testimony from the Endorois
community. This monumental evidentiary ruling brought the voices of an oppressed community into the hall of justice, and strengthened the reality of the indigenous struggle in Africa. The Commission's Rules of Procedure are silent in
regard to the kind of evidence that is admissible. Parties to disputes before the
Commission have been innovative in submitting various forms of evidence to
which the Commission has acquiesced. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 32, at
Rule 11; see also General Recommendations, supra note 33.
36 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at
292. The Inter-American
Court has ruled for restitution of ancestral territory to an indigenous group, including demarcation. See Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Case No. 11.577, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R.,(Ser. C.) (2001). CERD recognizes the right to just, fair and prompt compensation for violations of indigenous land rights.
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sought a non-liquidated amount of monetary compensation as recompense
for their unlawful and forced eviction.37
The African Charter's unfortunate silence on remedies, however,
often renders the Commission's decision subject to disarticulation. Consequently, in practice, it is incumbent on the Applicants to carefully fashion
and plead specific remedies. In the context of the Endorois claim, the Applicants emphasized policy recommendations. Despite the lack of direction
provided by the African Charter, the Commission, in past practice, issued
declaratory orders regarding rights violations and outlined recommendations for legal change.38 The call for amendments in domestic law is consonant with state obligations under Article 1 of the African Charter to "adopt
legislative and other measures to bring its domestic laws into conformity
with the Charter." The Commission has more recently issued recommendations for compensation. 39
The African Commission's Decision on the Merits upheld all of the
Endorois' requests for relief. As mentioned above, the Commission formally declared that Kenya violated six African Charter Rights. 40 The Com37

Id.; see also Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at 1 22.

See Endorois Communication, supranote 1, at1293. The Community actually
framed this compensation as a remedy "to the community for all the loss they have
suffered through the loss of their property, development, and natural resources, but
also freedom to practice their religion and culture. Endorois Decision, supra note
3, at 1 22.
39 See, e.g., Lawyers for Human Rights v. Swaziland, Comm. No. 251/2002, 63,
Afr. Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights (2005). "[T]he African Commission is
of the view that the Kingdom of Swaziland by its Proclamation of 1973 and the
subsequent Decree NO.3 of 2001 violated Articles 1, 7, 10, 11, 13 and 26 of the
African Charter." The Commission then recommended that the law be amended to
bring it into compliance with the African Charter.
40 In the Endorois case, the Kenyan government sought the Commission's application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation in vehemently refuting the pursuit
of compensation by the community. Kenya's Response, supra note 9, 3.4.5. Kenya's suggestion implicitly relies on the precedent of the European Court for
38

Human Rights which has allowed states wide discretion to address issues that national institutions are better suited to appreciate. See Handyside v U.K., 24 Eur. Ct.
H.R.,

11 48-49 (1976); see Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, 258-B Eur.

Ct. H. R. (1993). See generally, F.G. JACAOBS AND R.C.A
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1996).
sion to be:

WHITE, THE EUROPEAN

In this respect, Kenya urged the Commis-

[G]uided by the principles under the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States on compensation where, if disputes/questions arise after expropriation on compensation, it shall be settled
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mission recommended that Kenya "[r]ecognize rights of ownership to the
Endorois and restitute Endorois ancestral land." 4 1 The Commission further
stated that Kenya should, "[e]nsure that the Endorois community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and surrounding sites for religious and
cultural rites and for grazing their cattle." 42 In addition to the remedy of
restitution, the Commission urged Kenya to "[p]ay adequate compensation
to the community for the loss suffered," and "[p]ay royalties to the Endorois
for existing economic activities and ensure that they benefit from employment possibilities within the Reserve." 4 3
The Commission's choice of compensation is a positive one, being
both in conformity with past practice and supported by various cases in
several jurisdictions which confirm the necessity of compensation for spoliation of indigenous natural resources and land." The restitution of property
is unusual under both the Charter and the practice of the Commission, but
the remedy is not unique internationally. While the Commission should be
lauded for its recommendation that Kenya restitute the Endorois' ancestral
land, the Commission failed in several respects.
First, the Commission did not recommend that the state identify and
demarcate Endorois territory. 45 Second, the African Commission failed to
articulate a temporal limit to the right of indigenous communities to regain
their ancestral land. This requirement would fashion a more coherent land
restitution remedy, ensuring that a floodgate of similar claims is checked.
Relevant comparative jurisprudence such as Sawjoyamaxa Indigenous
under the domestic law of the expropriating state and by its tribunals, unless the state concern expressly agrees to submit the issues to an international tribunal in accordance with the principle
of free choice of means.
See Kenya's Response, supra note 9, 3.4.5.
41 See Endorois Decision, supra note 3.
42 Id. at 80.
43

Id.

Id. In addition, to the main recommendations regarding restitution and compensation, the Commission made several points to address cooperation with the
Community on these issues and future ones. The Commission recommended that
Kenya "(e) Grant registration to the Endorois Welfare Committee;" "(f) Engage in
dialogue with the Complainants for the effective implementation of these recommendations;" and "(g) Report on the implementation of these recommendations
within three months from the date of notification."
45 See Alexkor Ltd. v Richtersveld Cmty., et. al., 2003 (5) SA 469 (CC) (S.Afr);
Delgamuukw v. B.C. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.); Mabo v. Queensland 11 (1992)
175 C.L.R I (Austl.); R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (Can.).
44
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Community v. Paraguay,suggests that rights remain in force so long as the
people retain a spiritual or material relationship with the lands. 46 Specifically, this relationship includes a traditional, spiritual, or ceremonial presence, settlement or sporadic cultivation, seasonal or nomadic hunting, use
of natural resources connected with custom and any other factor characteristic of their culture. 47
II. THE EVOLVING CONTRIBUTION OF THE ENDOROIS COMMUNICATION
A.

Being Indigenous in Africa

The Endorois asserted that their "culture, religion, and traditional
way of life are intimately intertwined with their ancestral lands, Lake
Bogoria and the surrounding area." 48 By advancing this view, the Endorois
See Yakye Axa, supra note 9, at 23. In contrast to the Commission's silence
on the contours of the territory, the Inter-American Court for Human Rights utilized the Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation to favour state discretion to delineate
the boundaries of indigenous territories and resolve multiple competing claims over
the same land The court deemed itself incompetent to identify traditional lands for
the settlement of indigenous peoples but determined that its responsibility was to
assess whether the state respected and guaranteed the rights of indigenous peoples
to their communal property. The Court stated that, "it is up to the state to delimit,
46

demarcate, title and return the land .

.

. because it is the state that possesses the

technical and scientific expertise to do so." See also Pasqualucci,infra note 79, at
298. The African Commission has more recently applied the doctrine. See Prince v
South Africa, Comm. No. 255/2002, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights
(2004). The Commission cautiously adopted the doctrine but warned that "reliance
on the margin of appreciation doctrine does not preclude the Commission from
assessing the reasonableness of a state's limitation of an African Charter right." See
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 245/2002 Afr.
Comm'n on Human and People's Rights (2006). The Zimbabwean government
urged the Commission "to be alive to the international human rights principles of
margin of appreciation and make decisions that are both capable of practicable
application and beneficial for the parties concerned." See also Zimbabwe Response
to Decision of the Commission in 21st Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, [ 4.3, Doc. EX.CL/322 (X). If the Commission were to employ the doctrine in this area, it may provide a worrying
advantage for states to shrink land rights.
47 Sawjoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No.
146 (2006) (noting that rights subsist even when an indigenous group has been kept
out of the land for a period of time through threat of violence).
48 For the Endorois, these factors were exhaustively argued out before the Commission, although the Kenyan government position was that the communities' right
to the land had been foreclosed by the State's action to set it aside under the rele-
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sought to anchor their property rights and right to natural resources claims
at the African Commission on their identity as a people whose association
with a specific territory is relevant to their survival. The significance of this
posturing will become clear because indigenous rights, despite numerous
academic discussion in recent years, still meet difficult conceptual and normative challenges. 49
On a conceptual level, the idea of "indigenous" and "peoples" appear to suffer from definitional uncertainty.5 0 No consensus on the terminology has crystallized because "the terms attempt to fix for international law
purposes aspects of group identity that are inherently contextual and forever
subject to change."5 ' While the absence of a universally accepted definition

vant statute. Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 66-120; Kenya's Response, supra note 9, at
3.3.2-3.3.4.
49 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at
40.
50 See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual
Structures of Indigenous Peoples' Claims in Internationaland Comparative Law,
in PEOPLES' RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed. 2001); S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); Luis RODRIGUEZ PINERO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POSTCOLONIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ILO REGIME (1919-1989)
(2006); ZELIM SKUBARTY, As IF PEOPLES MATTERED: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
PEOPLES AND MINORITIES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
AND BEYOND (2000); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED
NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-DETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND (2007).
51

While scholarship has grappled with various definitions, no universal consensus

has been attained. S. James Anaya, states that indigenous persons are so-called
"because their ancestral roots are imbedded in the lands in which they live . . . and
they are peoples to the extent that they comprise distinct communities with a continuity of existence and identity that links them to the communities, tribes or nations of their ancestral past." ANAYA, supranote 50, at 3. Jose Martfnez Cobo, the

former U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, provides another definition:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which,
having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves
distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
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is often criticized, 52 scholars and advocates emphasize the primacy of selfdefinition as central to identifying right-holders.5 3 Self-identification should
neither detract from the validity of the term nor be seen as an empty mantra.
One could argue that self-identification is in fact rooted in the notion of
autonomy of the self, the liberal personhood upon which human rights are
vested. In fact, we hold the view that self-identification, as opposed to a
narrower inaccurate definition, provides flexibility in its application to the
highly varied contexts within which indigenous groups exist globally. 54
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. On Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of Minorities, Study on the Problem of DiscriminationAgainst
Indigenous Populations, 379, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986 (1986) (preparedby
Jose Martinez Cobo) [hereinafter Martinez Cobo Report].
Erica-Irene Daes, Chairperson of the U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Persons
(WGIP), outlined four criteria that can be used in the identification of indigenous
peoples, similar to the characteristics listed above: 1) the occupation and use of a
specific territory; 2) the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which
may include the aspects of language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws, and institutions; 3) self-identification as well as
recognition by other groups, as a distinct collectivity; and 4) an experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion, or discrimination. Afr.
Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights, Working Group of Experts on Indigenous
Populations/Communities, Report of the Afr. Commission's Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities (2005) [hereinafter Afr. Commission's Working Group], available at http://www.iwgia.org/graphics/Synkron
Library/Documents/publications/Downloadpublications/Books/AfricanCommission
bookEnglish.pdf.
52 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICTs 3 (David Wippman ed.,1998).
53 SKUBARTY, supra note 50, at 45. Zelim Skubarty argues that the lack of clear
definition gives states a means for diminishing their liability in international human
rights law. He contends:
[T]he reasons why attempts to reach agreement on definition ...
are resisted by so many states is that by denying their existence
they can prevent any authoritative disclosure of the human rights
violations, any attempts at measuring and scrutinizing the minority situation and thus downplay the increasing support for the
concept of the .

.

. right of the international community to inter-

vene in the internal affairs of a state in exceptional humanitarian
circumstances.
See Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group Established
in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March
1995, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/89/Add.I (Feb. 24, 2005) [preparedby Luis Enrique
Chdivez].
54
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While normative challenges also exist in relation to specific rights
held by indigenous peoples, they should not distract from the recognition of
these rights.55 Moreover, various international instruments elaborate on the
content and scope of the rights of indigenous people. They include ILO
Convention No. 169, Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and its interpretations by the Human Rights Committee,5 6 and most
importantly, the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.' 57
In seeking to explain away some of the ontological difficulties associated with the concept of indigenous peoples' rights, some authors have
5 See Commission on Human Rights, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolution of
Standards Concerning the Rights of Indigenous People: The Concept of "Indigenous Peoples", Addendum: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission,
U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4/Sub.2/AC.4/l996/2/Add.l (June 10, 1996) [hereinafter Standard-SettingActivities] (discussing the import of an unequivocal definition of indigenous persons in the Draft Declaration and other international human rights
instruments).
56 S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter American Human
Rights System, 14 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 33, 41 (2001) (arguing that indigenous
rights have crystallized from customary international law). This view would appear
to sit well with constructivists, some of whom see norm development as cyclical
and continuous process beginning with "norm emergence," proceeding through
"norm cascade," and ending with "internalization." Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L. ORG. 887,
917 (1998).
57 Treaty law, especially Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), is certainly an important source of indigenous rights.
Article 27 states:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with the other members of their group to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
Doc A/6316 (March 23, 1976). See also infra note 63. See also Internationl Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, (Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention] ILO Convention No. 169 elaborates a comprehensive corpus
of human rights for indigenous people. Its global utility is however vitiated by the
low levels of ratification from countries in Latin America. But see PINERO, supra
note 50 at 331. Nevertheless, the influence of ILO Convention No. 169 as a "vehicle for a normative understanding of modern international regime on indigenous
peoples," is hard to dispute.
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constructed them as a sui generis category of rights.58 This view holds that
indigenous peoples' rights are inherent and their mere non-textualization do
not deprive them of normative value. We believe such attempts are
counterproductive. 59 Instead, we view indigenous rights as representing a
bold and creative attempt at interpreting traditional human rights norms
through the lense of historically excluded and marginalized groups. 60 Specifically, this approach requires a contextual awareness in the application of
rights to indigenous communities, such as the Endorois in Kenya. Indeed,
human rights supervisory bodies have held that property rights, for instance,
acquire an "autonomous meaning" when applied to indigenous people. 6 1

See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of
Indigenous Peoples' Claims in Internationaland Comparative Law, in PEOPLES'
58

RIGHTS

69 (Philip Alston ed., 2001). Kingsbury has pointed out that indigenous

peoples' claims under international law come from five main different directions
including sui generis claims. See also Howard R. Berman, Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to InternationalJuridicalPersonality?,79 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.

189, 193 (1989). Berman argues that indigenous peoples' rights constitute a sui
generis category of rights that arise outside of the positive law system. They are
"pre-existing rights in the sense that they are not developed from the legal system
of surrounding states but [they] arise sui generis from the historical condition of
indigenous peoples as distinctive societies with the aspiration to survive as such."
See also J6r6mie Gilbert, Indigenous Rights in the Making: The United Nations
Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 14 INT'L J. MINORITY & GROUPS
RTs. 207 (2007).

59 See Part III(A) infra regarding Africa's opposition to the UN Declaration on
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
60 International Workshop on the Draft Declaration the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG. 15/CRP. 1 (Nov. 29, 2005) (preparedby Govt. of
Mex.). "The experts underlined that the draft Declaration does not aim to propose
new principles of international law, but builds upon and affirms existing ones,
which have been recognized in international jurisprudence, international instruments, as well as in customary law."
61 See Awas Tingni, supra note 33 at
146:

The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, for which reason they cannot be made equivalent

to the meaning given to them in domestic law. Furthermore, such
human rights treaties are live instruments whose interpretation
must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, to current living conditions.
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Further, while cultural rights are universal to all human beings, 6 2 they acquire a unique meaning when applied to indigenous people. 63
Aware of these contestations, the Endorois Communication sought
to hew out an understanding of indigenous identity in Africa that is consistent with emerging international human rights standards. Moreover, the use
of the indigenous rights discourse was strategically designed to permit the
Endorois to draw from the emerging international standards and jurisprudence on indigenous peoples rights, as will become evident in Part III of
this paper. Appropriately, the African Commission's Decision on the Merits provides considerable discussion on the various definitions of indigenous
peoples present in international discourse.
The Commission reiterated that the term does not create a special
class of citizens, but addresses "present-day injustices and inequalities."64
The Commission noted "that there is a common thread that runs through all
the various criteria that attempts to describe indigenous peoples - that inThe right to culture is recognized in various international and regional instruments. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27, G.A. res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Cultural rights are incorporated in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), which states, "Everyone has the right
freely to participate in the cultural life of the community . . ." See also African
Charter,supra note 4, at art. 22 (guaranteeing the right of all peoples to economic,
social and cultural development); Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 29,
G.A. res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Sept. 2, 1990) (recommending that the education of a child is geared towards developing a respect for his or her cultural identity, language and values, for the cultural values of the country in which the child is
living); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15,
G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Jan. 3, 1976) (upholding the right
of everyone to take part in cultural life).
63 See Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Human Rights Committee, General
Comment 23, Art. 27, 7 (Fiftieth Session, 1994), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1
(July 29,1994). The General Comment states:
62

With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under
article 27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in
many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the
use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing
or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law.
This view had earlier been confirmed by the Human Rights Committee in: Chief
Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Human Rights Comm.,
Comm. No. 167/1984, 1 33, U.N. Doc.A/45/40 (March 26, 1990).
149.
64 Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at
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digenous peoples have an unambiguous relationship to a distinct territory
and that all attempts to define the concept recognize the linkages between
people, their land, and culture." 65 In applying these standards to the Endorois, the Commission determined that, "Endorois culture, religion, and
traditional way of life are intimately intertwined with their ancestral lands Lake Bogoria and the surrounding area.66 Furthermore, the Commission
upheld the idea that self-identification is key to the recognition of indigenous rights and accepted, "that self-identification for the Endorois as indigenous individuals and acceptance as such by the group is an essential
component of their sense of identity." 67 Consequently, the Communication
and the resulting Decision on the Merits relied on and thereby legitimated
the developing consensus, within the African Commission itself and the
African Union, 68 on the relationship between the identity of indigenous peoples in the continent and their unique association with a specific territory
that is relevant to their survival. 6 9
Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at 154. The Commission also took note of
the criteria outlined by African Commission's Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities: "occupation and use of a specific territory; the
voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness; self-identificaiton as a distinct
collectivity, as well as recognition by other groups; an experience of subjugation,
marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination." Id. at 1 150.
66 Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at
156.
67 Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at
157. The Commission affirmed that the
"heart of indigenous rights" is "the right to preserve one's identity through identification of ancestral lands, cultural patterns, social institutions and religious
systems."
68 See Decision on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
8, Jan.
Peoples, Assembly of the African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.141(VIII),
position
a
united
29, 2007) [hereinafter Afr. Union Decision]. "Decides to maintain
in the negotiations on amending the Declaration and constructively work alongside
other Member States of the United Nations in finding solutions to the concerns of
African States." While appearing like a set back, Africa's rejection of the Declaration would for the first time bring indigenous rights discussion before the highest
continental organ-the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments. From a constructivist approach, the subsequent endorsement of the Declaration implies the
maturation of norms. See, e.g., Asbj0rn Eide, Dynamics of Human Rights and the
Role of the Educator, in FRONTIERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION, 105, 107
(AsbjOrn Eide and Marek Thee eds., 1983) (presenting the idea that such dialogues
generate "idealization, positivization and realization" of norms).
69 See AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN & PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE

65

AFRICAN COMMISSION'S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS/COMMUNITIES

86-88 (2005):
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The Right to Natural Resources

The Endorois asserted that their right to property and natural resources under the Charter were violated and requested that the Commission
"recognise their rights to communal property rights to their ancestral lands,"
because "[t]his falls within the scope of Article 14."70 While the African
Charter creates two distinct rights, to both property (Article 14) and the free
disposal of wealth and natural resources (Article 21), the two rights interact
quite closely in the context of traditional lands.7' In particular, because indigenous people look at land and its resources in a wholistic fashion, the
violations of their right to property and natural resources appurtenant to it
occur contemporaneously. The artificiality of creating different incidences
with regard to the two rights becomes intensely clear in the case of the
Endorois who, upon eviction from their land, also lost access to" traditional
medicines made from herbs found around the Lake and resources, such as
salt licks and fertile soil, which provided support for their cattle and therefore their pastoralist way of life." 72
In Africa, indigenous land and natural resources rights-the most
contested property domain-are a tinderbox apt to ignite. Predicated upon
conquest and scattered warped treaties, 7 3 British colonial annexation of Af[Use of the term indigenous] is by no means an attempt to question the identity of other groups or to deny any Africans the right
to identify as indigenous to Africa or to their country. In a strict
sense all Africans are indeed indigenous to Africa. . . it is a term
fighting for rights and justice for those particular groups who are
perceived negatively by dominating mainstream development
paradigms. . .One of the misunderstandings is that to protect the
rights of indigenous peoples would be to give special rights to
some ethnic groups over and above the rights of all other groups
within a state. This is not the case. . . .the issue is that certain
marginalised groups are discriminated against in particular ways
because of their particular culture [and] mode of production.
..... The call of these marginalised groups to protection of their
rights is a legitimate call to alleviate this particular form of
discrimination.
70 Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 57.
7
Endorois Decision, supranote 3, at 1122. The African Commission noted in its
Decision on the Merits that, "Article 21 of the African Charter is, however, wider
in its scope than Article 14, and requires respect for a people's right to use natural
resources, even where people do not have title to the land."
72 Id. at 1 I31
7
Some treaties between native communities and colonial authorities were concluded in Africa. See P.G. McHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON
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rica was bitter and tumultuous. Invoking the Latin maxim cuius est solum,
eius est usque ad caelum et ad inferos (whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up

to the sky and down to the depths), the colonial authorities in Africa bundled together all the incidents of property and assigned them to the ultimate
control of the state. 74 The right to natural resources under the African Charter should be appreciated from both this challenging historical perspective
and the broader context of multinational corporate interests which often undermine communities' natural resource rights.75
LAW (2004) (discussing possibilities of the conclusion of a series of three distinct
treaties with various Xhosa chiefs). The agreement negotiated between the Maasai
of Kenya and the British is, perhaps, the most well-known treaty. See also LOTTE
HUGHES, MOVING THE MAASAI: A COLONIAL MISADVENTURE (2006); BONNY
IBHAWOH, IMPERIALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COLONIAL DISCOURSES OF RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES IN AFRICAN HISTORY 26, 32-33 (2007). (discussing treaty rights in
Southern Nigeria):
The treaty of peace and friendship between the Britain and the
chiefs of Ife in 1888 recognized the independence of the King-

dom of Ife, which paid 'tribute to no other power.' The 'treaty of
friendship and commerce' between Britain and Egba in 1893
fully recognized the Egba independence and provided a basis for
the formation and autonomous operation of the Egba .
74 See Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution
of TribalControl Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541 (1993) The position
in the United States differs regarding certain natural resources within reservation,
including sub-surface resources being held to belong to the tribal group for whom
the reservation is held.
7 See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
ECONOMIC CRIMES: HOLDING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY LIABLE FOR ACTS OF
FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT 9 (2006). The author defines indigenous spoliation as
". . . an illegal act of depredation which is committed for private ends by constitu-

tionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." While the spoliation being addressed by the author goes beyond the text of the African Charter's
Article 21, one can find culpability in relation to the manner in which some of the
lands occupied by indigenous minorities have been privatized or seized purportedly
for public purposes. See also The Social and Economic Rights Action Center for

Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96, 40, Afr. Comm'n on
Human and Peoples' Rights (2001) [hereinafter Ogoni Communication]. Where the
Commission, in assessing the question of natural resource spoliation asserted: "The
aftermath of colonial exploitation has left Africa's precious resources and people
still vulnerable to foreign misappropriation. The drafters of the Charter obviously

wanted to remind African governments of the continent's painful legacy and restore
co-operative economic development to its traditional place at the heart of African
Society." Id. at 1 56.
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The Kenyan state justified the exclusion of the Endorois from Lake
Bogoria on the grounds that the game reserve would ensure that:
Wildlife is managed and conserved so as to yield to the
Nation in general and to individual areas in particular, optimum returns in terms of cultural, aesthetic and scientific
gains as well as economic gains as are incidental to proper
wildlife management and conservation.76
This assertion of the Kenyan government begs the question whether
the act of totally excluding an indigenous community from its long-standing
territory for economic development is consistent with a State's obligation
under the African Charter. Even if such action is permitted under the Charter, the question then becomes whether the solution-expulsion-is proportionate to the purposes intended, namely to conserve the land for tourism.77
In countering the state's allegation that their expulsion was the most rationale means to secure the land for tourism, the Endorois contended that:
The cultural activities of the. . .community pose no harm to
the ecosystem of the reserve and the restriction of cultural
rights would not therefore be justified on such a basis. In
addition, the practice of Endorois cultural ceremonies could
not be considered to affect the profits of the Game Reserve.
Human interest in the cultural richness of the Endorois culture would, if anything, attract greater tourist attention.78
In deference to the Kenyan government position, we concede that
the right to communal ancestral indigenous lands and the natural resources
under international human rights law, "is relative and must be balanced
against the competing claims to the land in question." 79 Such restrictions or
intrusion on the enjoyment of property rights by indigenous people while
permissible, however, "must be sanctioned by specific laws for the express
purpose of serving a compelling public interest."80
Implicit in both the Endorois claim and the overall indigenous
rights discussion is the appropriate balance between the community's needs
on the one hand and the State's obligation to ensure that natural resources
are exploited in a manner that meets national objectives, on the other. In
Kenya Response, supra note 9, at 1 3.34.
n See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 11 81-100
78 Id. at$ 210.
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See Jo M. Pasqualucci The Evolution of InternationalIndigenous Rights in the
Inter American Human Rights System, 6 Hum. RTs. L. REv. 281, 298 (2006).
80 Id. at 299.
79
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Ogoni, the Commission linked the right to land for minority group members
to their right to life.8' Clearly, the Commission must consider the impact of
state seizure of land on an indigenous community while at the same time
assessing any benefits accrued to the state as a whole. Arguably, in the
Endorois case, the price was heavily born by the community 82 and the equilibrium should be restored in their favour. In either case, the Commission
must pursue internationally accepted standards of reasonableness which, in
this context, demand for a fair and just "relationship between a particular
objective and the administrative or legislative means used to achieve that
objective."8 3 The Endorois Communication presented the Commission with
an opportunity to further define the contours of its balancing process in
pursuit of an effective compromise between state public and the rights of
vulnerable communities.
C.

The Right to Development

The alleged violation of the right to development8 4 in this case is
grounded on the State's failure to "adequately involve the Endorois in the
development process. . [and] ensure their continued improvement."85 In this
approach, the Communication embraces the understanding of the right to
development propounded by the United Nations Declaration on the Right to
Development. 6
While development as a human right occupies a prominent place in
international discourse,87 it nonetheless remains contested due to the difficulty in properly assessing states' obligations. In particular, the Charter's
elaboration of the right is rendered in the collective, which makes an accuOgoni Communication, supra note 75, at 1 67.
82 See, e.g., Endorois Communication, supranote 1,at 9115. "Approximately half
of the Endorois Community's livestock died during the first years after eviction."
81

83 Grainee De Burca, The Principleof Proportionalityand its Application in the
EC Law, in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW I (A. Barav & D.A. Wyatt eds., 1993).
84 African Charter, supra note 4, art. 22. "All peoples shall have the right to their

economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and
identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind."
85 Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 217.
86 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 220-225 (this position is understandable considering that the Declaration on the Right to Development was
initiated and adopted with strong support of third world countries); see also U.N.
Declaration on the Right to Development, G. A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc. A/41/625
(1986).
87 N.J. Udombana, The Third World and the Right to Development: Agenda for
the Next Millenium, 22 Hum. RTS. Q. 753, 765 (2000).
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rate determination of its beneficiaries difficult and subject to debate.
Whether the right to development is "a legally binding right, whether it is
simply a manifestation of other (already accepted) rights, and to whom the
rights belongs are issues that have not been settled by international law." 8 1
Arjun Sangupta, the former United Nations Independent Expert on the
Right to Development, however, rejects the aspirational arguments attributed to this right, arguing,
[A] process can be regarded as a right just as much as the
outcomes of the process can as objects of the claim or entitlement. This is possible so long so long as the corresponding obligations for realizing those rights can be clearly
specified and the improvement in the realization of the
rights can be clearly identified. . .89
While the African Commission has not yet elaborated on the right
to development under Article 22 of the African Charter,90 it indicted the
Nigerian government for its failure to "involve the Ogoni Communities in
the decisions that affected the development of Ogoniland." 9 1 This position
calls for states to ensure prior, informed consultation with indigenous peoples for development of lands under their occupation or use. 9 2
What the Endorois Communication failed to do, however, was to
outline the contours of a development process involving indigenous communities which runs counter to states' aspirations of modernization and economic development. To be sure, the Community's insistence on the
procedural rights of participation and consultation and an emphasis on equity, is intended to provide space for the emergence of such a developmen88 RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: FROM THE
CAN UNION 240 (2007).
89

OAU

TO THE AFRI-

Arjun Sengupta, Development Co-operationand the Right to Development, in

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBJORN EIDE 373 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2003) (on the potentially
profound implications of the Declaration on development assistance, debt policies,
foreign investment and international trade law).
90 African Charter, supra note 4, art. 22.

All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity
and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development."
91
92

55
Ogoni Communication, supra note 75, at
See, e.g., ILO Convention, supra note 57, art. 60.
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tal paradigm. 93 The Endorois' contribution to the elaboration of the right to
development is, perhaps, to resist pre-determined targets and focus instead
on the need for creating spaces for community participation. The political
character of development and its link to the interests of the majority, implies that for indigenous people development cannot be extricated from
their right to self determination. 9 4

III.

THE ENDOROIS CLAIM AND THE UNITED NATIONs DECLARATION
ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples stands as a significant pronouncement on the legal treatment of indigenous persons by the international community. 95 The African Commission's
consideration of the merits of the Endorois claim falls at a historic juncture
in the evolution of international indigenous rights, standing as one of the
first quasi-judicial decisions after the adoption of the Declaration. 96 It was
imperative, therefore, that the African Commission take note of the Declaration's adoption in its consideration of the Endorois Claim. 97 Les Malezer,
93

See Endrois Communication, supra note 3, at

1

248-50.

CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFEST. FOR EARTH JUSTICE

See generally
(2003); TONY

SIMPSON, INDIGENOUs HERITAGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE CULTURE AND

(1997) (discussing indigenous notions of property rights and development).
94 The Kenyan government for instance argues in rebutting Endorois' allegations
of a violation of their right to development that "[t]he community is represented in
the County Council by their elected councilors, therefore presenting the community
the opportunity to always be represented in the forum where decisions are made
pertaining to development." See Kenya Response, supra note 9, 17.3.1.
95 HLRN Welcomes UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples' Rights, HOUSING
1-2 (Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://www.hicAND LAND RIGHTS NETWORK,
net.org/news.asp?PID=399 (last visited May 3, 2008). For the full text of the Declaration, see Declaration,supra note 8.
96 See Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on
the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13,
2007) availableat http://www.un.org/esalsocdev/unpfii/documents/Declaration-ipsg.doc. "The Secretary-General warmly welcomes the adoption of the Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a triumph for indigenous peoples around the
world. He notes that this marks a historic moment when UN Member States and
indigenous peoples reconciled with their painful histories . . . ."
97 Declaration, supra note 8, art. 42. "The United Nations, its bodies, including
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at
the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full application of the
provisions of this Declaration and follow up to the effectiveness of this DeclaraINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
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Chairman of the Global Indigenous Caucus, stated, "The Declaration is a
framework for States to link and integrate with the Indigenous Peoples, to
initiate new and positive relations but this time without exclusion, without
discrimination and without exploitation." 98 Accordingly, the Commission
needs to embrace the Declaration as a necessary framework to fully understanding the content of the African Charter rights as they apply to indigenous communities.
Part III of this paper contends that the African Commission failed
to utilize its power under Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter to expressly interpret the relevant Charter rights through the Declaration.99 First,
we will begin with a brief discussion of the African Commission's acceptance of the Declaration, within the context of regional solicitude about its
principles. We will then proceed to examine Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, their previous employment, and prospects for its use. This is
followed by a discussion of the value of reading the Declaration's provisions into the Charter when applying the Charter's substantive rights to indigenous communities.
A.

The United Nations Declarationand the African Commission

The African perspective on the international human rights law of
indigenous peoples was crucial to the successful adoption of the Declaration. 00 The African states reluctance to affirm indigenous rights stands in
tion." The implementation of the Declaration is currently under discussion in relevant bodies of the United Nations, including the Human Rights Council. Stefania
Errico, The UN Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is Adopted: An
Overview, 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 756, 759 (2007), available at http://hrlr.oxfordjour-

nals.org/cgi/reprint/7/4/756.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2008). See also Frequently
Asked Questions: Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.un.
org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf (last visited May

3, 2008) [hereinafter FAQs]. "Many of the rights in the Declaration require new
approaches to global issues, such as development, decentralization and multicultural democracy. Countries will need to pursue participatory approaches in their
interactions with indigenous peoples that will require meaningful consultations and
the building of partnerships with indigenous peoples."
98 Les Malezer, Chairman of the Global Indigenous Caucus, Statement by the
Chairman (Sept. 13, 2007) availableat http://cpcabrisbane.org/Kasama/2007/V21
n3/GloballndigenousCaucus.htm.
99 See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 60.

100 See Explanation of Prior Steps Taken by the African Union before the Adoption
of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlissues/indigenous/declaration.htm (discussing the consensus among African
States on the need to delay the adoption of the Declaration provided the African
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sharp contrast to the African Commission's position on the Declaration. 0 1
Following the impasse initiated by the African group in November 2006,
the African Commission issued a persuasive Advisory Opinion to address
African states' five major concerns with the Declaration.10 2 The Advisory
Opinion illuminated both the potential impact of contentious principles in
relation to the African Charter and provided a practical approach to understanding the Declaration's provisions. The African Commission emphasized the Advisory Opinion, "could allay some of the concerns raised
surrounding the human rights of indigenous populations and wishes to reiterate its availability for any collaborative endeavour with African States in
03
this regard with a view to the speedy adoption of the Declaration."
The African Commission's approach, therefore, may be viewed as
recognizing the political value of the African region embracing the Declaration.'0 The African Commission's Communique, issued after the adoption
group power over the process.); see Decision on the United Nations Declaration on
8 (Jan.
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Doc. Assembly/AU/9 (VII) ADD.6,
2007) [hereinafter AU Declaration]. The African Union "[d]ecides to maintain a
united position in the negotiations on amending the Declaration and constructively
work alongside other Member States of the United Nations in finding solutions to
the concerns of African States."
101 Compare AU Declaration, supra note 100, at 1 3 ("Expresses concern at the
political, economic, social and constitutional implications of the Declaration on the
African continent") with African Commission, Communique on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.achpr.org/
english/resolutions/resolutionl21_en.htm [hereinafter Commission Communique]
("The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights welcomes the adoption
of the UN Declaration . .

.

. This Declaration is a very important document for the

promotion and protection of indigenous peoples' rights all over the world, including on the African continent.").
102 See Advisory Opinion of the African Commission on Human & Peoples' Rights
7-8
on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
(2007) available at www.chr.up.ac.za/indigenous/acwg/07-08-08AdvisoryOpinion
ENG_1.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion] The Commission issued the Advisory
Opinion under the authority of Article 45(1) and 45(3) of the African Charter. See
also African Charter, supra note 4, at art. 45(1). "The functions of the Commission
shall be: . . . to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African
problems in the field of human and peoples' rights . . . , disseminate information

. . . .and should the case arise, gives its views or make recommendations to
Governments."
103 Advisory Opinion, supra note 102, at
45.
1" See Commission Communique, supra note 101, at 1 4. "The African Commission notes with satisfaction that the great majority of African states voted in favour
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of the Declaration, is indicative of its perspective that, "With the adoption
of the UN Declaration a giant step has been taken towards securing the
survival of indigenous peoples and their unique cultures based on their own
needs and visions." 05 The Declaration-elaborating upon existing international human rights standards as they apply to indigenous peoples-affirms
rights for which states are presently responsible. 0 6 The Commission's positive view of the Declaration may constitute a diplomatic move but also an
effort to place the African region at the forefront of creating understanding
about the Declaration's substantive content.
The Commission's past embrace of the Declaration and its current
efforts to assess the situations of indigenous peoples in Africa suggest that
the utilization of the Declaration to interpret the African Charter was timely
and appropriate. The Commission's consideration of the Endorois claim
was the first time it decided an indigenous rights claim on the merits. 07
Moreover, the Commission's recommendation in the Endorois case followed quickly on the heels of the Declaration's adoption. 0 Of equal importance, was the opportunity for the Commission to affirm the positive
judicial advancements for indigenous rights occurring in African domestic
courts, amidst government recalcitrance.109
of the Declaration and that not a single African country voted against this groundbreaking international human rights instrument."
1o5 Id. at 1 3.
106 Indigenous Peoples' Caucus, United Nations: Declaration [on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples] Update 4 (Nov. 12, 2006), availableat http://www.unobserver.
com/layout5.php?id=2832&blz=l (discussing why a proposal to delay adoption
should not be supported).
107 See Press Release, Minority Rights Group International (MRG), Kenyan Endorois Legal Success Takes Historic Land Rights Case to Final Stage, I (July 12,

2005), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EVIU-6E9JBW
?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 31, 2008). CEMIRIDE's case on behalf of the
Endorois is historic in Africa because it is the first time the African Commission
will consider the merits of an indigenous land rights claim.
1os The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Sept. 13, 2007. See
Declaration, supra note 8.
109 See, e.g., Botswana: San Look Set to Return Home, INTEGRATED REGIONAL
INFORMATION NETWORKS, Jan. 11, 2007 (South Africa) availableat www.irinnews.
org/Report.aspx?ReportlD=64342. "The landmark judgment in favour of the San,
which ruled that the government had acted 'unconstitutionally' and 'unlawfully'
was hailed as a model for other legal challenges being mounted by indigenous
communities removed from ancestral land in other countries." The government of
Botswana originally moved the San tribe to ensure the park's viability as a nature
reserve and to integrate the community into Botswana's society. The government
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The African Commission, however, took note of the Declaration
rather sparingly throughout its Decision." 0 Consequently, the African
Commission lost an opportunity to put pressure to bear on the African
States to emerge at the forefront of indigenous rights recognition."' The
Commission needed to import the Declaration through Articles 60 and 61
into its understanding of the Charter when addressing Kenya's actions
against the Endorois community. In practice, this means the Commission
should have expressly read the Declaration's provisions into the Charter
rights, rendering them virtually inseparable as applied to indigenous rights
began relocating around 2,500 San from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in
1997. Leon Marshall, Bushmen Driven from Ancestral Lands in Botswana, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2003, available at news.nationalgeographic.
com/news/pf/60673620.html. Three weeks after the San achieved their court victory, they were chased away when they attempted to enter the reserve. See also
Brigitte Weidlich, Bostwana San Chasedfrom Reserve Again, THE NAMIBIAN, Jan.
5, 2007. For further information on the San and their similar circumstances in
Namibia, see "OUR LAND THEY TOOK": SAN LAND RIGHTS UNDER THREAT IN
NAMIBIA, LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTRE (NAMIBIA). LAND, ENVIRONMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (2006). See Lucianne Limo, Court OrdersECK to Carve Out
Constituencyfor Ilchamus, THE STANDARD, Dec. 18, 2006. Despite the negative

experience of the Endorois with the court system in Kenya, there have been positive results for indigenous communities in the country. In December 2006, the
Constitutional Court of Kenya issued a positive decision for an indigenous community. The Court ordered the Electoral Commission of Kenya to create a constituency for the Ilchamus indigenous community. Although some African governments
are reluctant to politically recognize indigenous communities and many positive
developments occur within the legal system, many states do recognize the rights of
indigenous peoples, including customary land rights. See, e.g., International Work
Group on Indigenous Affairs, Response Note to "The Draft Aide Memoire of the
African Group on the UN Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," (Feb.
14, 2007) (noting that the constitutions of Botswana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Uganda, all contain provisions for
indigenous rights recognition).
110 See Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at 1 81. The African Commission mentioned the Declaration in the context of the right to practice religion under Article
8. The Commission mentions the Declaration again in the context of the right to
property under Article 14. While the Commission expressed that it "officially
sanctioned" the Declaration, it references it as an international law and does not
weave it into the African Charter as we suggest in Part III. See id., at 11 204, 232.
1H See Shedrack C. Agbakwa, Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights, 5 YALE Hum. RTs. &
DEV. L.J. 177, 178 (2002) ("African States ought to take the lead in the enforcement of ESCR, given Africa's deplorable socio-economic conditions.").
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claims. Since the Declaration recognizes the unique status of indigenous
communities within the modern state and provides a framework to support
interaction between indigenous rights and national prerogatives, the Commission's employment of the two instruments in tandem was imperative.
The procedural mechanisms of article 60 and 61 must be utilized, in this
manner, to render the African Charter's rights effective in substantive understanding and implementation as regards indigenous communities.
B. Employment of Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charteron Human
and Peoples' Rights

1. Purpose of Article 60
The African Charter's provisions in Article 60 and 61 are a unique
attribute of the African Human rights system.1 2 According to Vincent 0.
Orlu Nmehielle, "They bring the African human rights mechanism within
the positive influence of the UN and other regional human rights experiences."ll 3 The Africa Charter, therefore, allows the utilization of other international human rights instruments to interpret the norms laid down in the
Charter.114 Article 60 of the ACHPR states:
Compare African Charter, supra note 4, arts. 60-61 with American Convention
on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (July 18, 1978),
reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82doc.6rev.1 at 25 (1992) and European Convention,
supra note 30. But see "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of
112

the Court Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 (Sept. 24, 1982), InterAm. Ct. H.R. ; Mary Caroline Parker, 'Other Treaties': the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights Defines its Advisory Jurisdiction,33 AM. U. L. REV. 211 (1983);
See also Anaya & Williams, supra note 56, at 42 (discussing the use, by the InterAmerican Commission, of article 29 of the American Convention to bring in other
international instruments.). Other regional systems, therefore, utilize comparative
international law to varying degrees despite the lack of express provisions within
their respective human rights conventions. Due to the fact that most of the African
Charter's provisions are generalist and not enumerative in nature, one could argue
that the Commission's use of comparative international law is mandated by pragmatism and does not need the express authorization of the Charter. Accordingly,
Articles 60 and 61 must represent a more unique approach to the use of international human rights law with reference to the Charter. See African Charter, supra
note 41; infra note 113 and accompanying text.
113 VINCENT 0. ORLU NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS
LAWS, PRACTICE, AND INSTITUTIONS

114 Id. at

158-159.

159 (2001).
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The Commission shall draw inspiration from international
law on human and peoples' rights, particularly from the
provisions of African instruments on human and peoples'
rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, other instruments adopted by the United
Nations and by African countries in the field of human and
peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various
instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter
are Members.' 1 5

Article 61 likewise provides:
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law, other
general or special international conventions, laying down
rules expressly recognized by member states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with
international norms on Human and Peoples' Rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law
recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and

doctrine.116
African Charter, supra note 4, art. 60.
116 African Charter, supra note 4, art. 61; see NMEHIELLE, supra note 113, at 159
(arguing that "the fact that the Article regards whatever inspirations that could be
derived here as subsidiary, does defeat the possible normative effect from these
other sources."). The authors of this paper take issue with this contention as article
61 provides that the Commission may utilize other instruments as "subsidiary measures to determine the principles of law." A plain reading of this phrase indicates
that other conventions are to be used as a supplement to understand or explain the
intention of the original African Charter right, not necessarily implying they are to
be considered of a secondary nature. The application of Article 61, as well as 60,
by the Commission, illustrates that this may not be the case. The Commission
often references both Article 60 and 61 together, ostensibly, categorizing them as
two halves of the same legal principle. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l v. Zambia, Comm.
No. 212/98, 42 Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rts. (1999), available in
Twelfth Annual Activity Report of the Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples'
Rights 1998-99, Covering Twenty-Fourth & Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Sessions, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES'
RIGHTS 751 (Hart Pub., Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans eds., 2001) [hereinafter
African Commission Documents The Commissions should act bearing in mind the
provisions of Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter."); Tsatsu Tsikata v. Republic of
115
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Article 60 outlines the normative effect of the general international
law of human rights with an emphasis on the work of the United Nations
and African human rights mechanisms.' 17 In contrast, Article 61 refers to a
broader realm of international law sources, including regional practices,
customary law, and general principles of law, but requires these sources be
"rules expressly recognized by Member States of the Organization of African Unity."" 8 Vincent 0. Orlu Nmehielle contends that when utilizing Article 61 and construing "whether an instrument accords with rules and
principles recognized by Member States of the OAU, one need not look at
the various state practices of these States, but at the regional or international
legal instruments to which these States are parties."" 9 While a useful perspective, the Commission has not indicated one way or the other that the
application of Article 61, or for that matter, Article 60, hinges on a State
being a party to the relevant Convention.1 20 Moreover, the Commission has
never fully or expressly articulated the import of these two unique Charter
principles through a Charter resolution or the interpretive mandate of Article 45.121 Nevertheless, a brief examination of the use of these Articles
throughout the Commission's jurisprudence will provide some measure of
clarity regarding their utility.
Ghana, Comm. No. 322/2006, 32 Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights
(2006), available in Twenty-First Activity Report of the Afr. Comm'n on Human
and Peoples' Rts., EX.CL/322(X), Executive Council, Tenth Ordinary Session, 52
(Jan. 2007) ("The Commission reiterates that the purpose of the mandates is to
consider complaints alleging such perceived judicial bias . . . in accordance with
... other relevant international human rights norms; in accordance with articles 60
and 61 of the Charter."). See also Draft Protocol to the African Charter on the
Human and Peoples' Rights of Women, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rts.,
reprintedin African Commission documents, at 775 ("Noting that Articles 60 and
61 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights recognize regional and
international norms on human and peoples' rights as being important reference
points for the application and interpretation of the Charter.").
117 See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 60; NMEHIELLE, supra note 113, at 159.
118 See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 61; NMEHIELLE, supra note 113, at 159.
I9 NMEHIELLE, supra note 113, at 159.
As part of its brief treatment of the Declaration, the African Commission did
note that Kenya withheld its approval of the Declaration. Endorois Decision, supra
note 3, at 155.
121 See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 45(3) ("Interpret all the provisions of the
present Charter at the request of a State party, an institution of the OAU or an
African Organization recognized by the OAU"); NMEHIELLE, supra note 129, at
159.
120

90
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Jurisprudential Employment of Article 60

In recent years, the African Commission has utilized articles 60 and
61 to varying degrees. In its landmark decision on the merits in The Social
and Economic Rights Action Center and the Centerfor Economic and So-

cial Rights v. Nigeria, the Commission brought in Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights through
Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter.122 Moreover, the Commission
did not discuss whether Nigeria signed and ratified the Covenant, or
whether Nigeria's acquiescence to the Covenant's provisions bore on the
Commission's application via Articles 60 and 61.123 Accordingly, Kenya's
abstention from the General Assembly vote on the Declaration would not
necessarily preclude the Commission from applying the Declaration to the
Charter, given the general acceptance of the Declaration on the African
continent.124
In practice, the Commission seems to view Articles 60 and 61 as
working in tandem to import relevant international law principles relating to
the African Charter and the issue under consideration.125 For instance, the
Commission alluded to the inseparability of the two articles in the case of
Ogoni Communication, supra note 73, at 1 48-49.
See generally id. The practice of the Commission seems to indicate that individual ratification of an incorporated instrument by the state in question is not a
requirement for its use in the Commission's analysis. For example, in another instance of judicial employment of Articles 60 and 61, the African Commission cited
cases from the Inter-American Commission and Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to illustrate the obligations imposed upon Zambia by
the African Charter, despite the fact that international agreements were not selfexecuting in that country. See also Legal Resources Found. v. Zambia, Comm. No.
211/98, 11 58-59, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights (2001), available
in Afr. Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights, Fourteenth Annual Activity Report
122
123

AHG/229(XXXVII), Conference of the Heads of State and Government, ThirtySeventh Ordinary Session, 93 (2001).
124 See Commission Communique, supra note 101, and accompanying text. Further support is provided in the text of Article 61 which states that the Commission
should consider rules "expressly recognized by member states of the Organization
of African Unity" without requiring those norms be recognized by all states or the
state in question. See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 61.

125

However, the Commission has, at times, separated the purposes of Article 60

from Article 61, outside of its judicial decision-making. See, e.g., Memorandum of
Understanding Between the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Art. H, 6, available in
Afr. Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights, Sixteenth Activity ReportAnnex IV,
27 (2002). The Commission stated:
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Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. The
Communication addressed the presence of the armed forces of the states of
Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in the Congo and their involvement in and
support for the rebel activities against the Congolese government. 126 In
considering the merits, the Commission stated:
The combined effect of Articles 60 and 61 of the African
Charter enables the Commission to draw inspiration from
international law on human and peoples' rights, . . . By

virtue of Articles 60 and 61 the Commission holds that the
Four Geneva Conventions and the two additional protocols
covering armed conflicts constitute part of the general principles of law recognized by African States, and take same
into consideration in the determination of this case.' 27
Additionally, on the few occasions the Commission did not employ
both articles together, the Commission did not always seem to follow the
textual distinction between them. For example, in The Law Office of Ghazi
Suleiman v. Sudan, the Commission examined alleged violations of freedom of expression by the government of Sudan against Ghazi Suleiman, a
lawyer.128 The Commission provided:

Pursuant to Article 60 of the African Charter, draw inspiration
from Resolutions, Recommendations and Decisions of the United
Nations Human Rights Treaty Monitoring and Charter-Based
Bodies, the Executive Committee of UNHCR and the relevant
Organs of the African Union, in undertaking joint actions with
the aim of more effectively promoting and protecting the human
rights of refugees, asylum seekers, returnees and other persons of
concern under their respective mandates; . . .
Dem. Rep. of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, & Uganda,Comm. No. 227/1999,
2-3, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights (2006), available in Afr.
Comm'n on Human & Peoples' Rights, Twentieth Activity Report,Executive
Council, Ninth Ordinary Session,Ex.CL/279 (IX), 112 (2006) [hereinafter Congo
Communication].
127 Id. at 170. Notably, the Communication's use of the Geneva Conventions and
the additional protocols is not preceded by an analysis of their general acceptance-through express ratification or state practice-by the African States. The
argument for the Commission to use the Declaration, signed by the majority of
African states, is thus strengthened by comparison. See supranote 104, and accompanying text.
128 See The Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v. Sudan, Comm. No. 228/99, 11 1-6,
Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights (2003), availablein Afr. Comm'n on
126
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47.

48.

Article 60 of the Charter provides that the African
Commission shall drawn inspiration from international law on human and peoples' rights.
The European Court of Human Rights recognises that
"freedom of political debate is at the very core of the
concept of a democratic society . . ."

49.

50.

The African Commission's view affirms those of Inter-American Court of Human Rights which held that:
"freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which
the very existence of a society rests. It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion....
The Inter-American Court states that -: "when an individual's freedom of expression is unlawfully restricted, it is not only the right of that individual that
is being violated, but also the right of all others to
"receive" information and ideas." It is particularly
grave when information that others are being denied
concerns the human rights protected in the African
Charter as did each instance in which Mr. Ghazi Suleiman was arrested. 129

The Commission's utilization of the Declaration for the purposes of
interpreting the African Charter would, for all intents and purposes, in light
of a textual analysis, stem from the language in Article 60 regarding United
Nations mechanisms. Though to the extent that the principles embodied in
the Declaration are nothing more than a codification of norms recognized in
domestic courts throughout the region, Article 61 is likewise an appropriate
procedural mechanism.1 30 The African Commission's recent history of
referencing international instruments through both Article 60 and 61 indiHuman & Peoples' Rights, Sixteenth Annual Activity Report, 48 (2003) [hereinafter Sudanese Communication].
129 Id. at 1 47-50. While the Sudanese Communication is a perfect example of
the Commission making little distinction between Articles 60 and 61, the Commission is only utilizing those articles to compare the African Charter right with other
regional instruments. The Commission, therefore, is employing those provisions in
a less effective manner than in Dem. Rep.of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda, & Uganda.

See Congo Communication, supra note 126, at 1 70.
130 See supra note 109, and accompanying text (regarding the recognition of indigenous rights in domestic courts). See also Anaya &Williams, supra note 55, at 54
("The multilateral processes that build a common understanding of the content of
indigenous peoples' rights, therefore, also build expectations of behaviour in conformity with those rights.").
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cates a willingness to interpret the African Charter in this fashion. The
Commission has firmly stated:
The African Commission is, therefore, more than willing to
accept legal arguments with the support of appropriate and
relevant international and regional human rights instruments, principles, norms, and standards taking into account
the well recognized principle of universality which was established by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 and which declares that "all human rights are
universal, indivisible, interdependent,and interrelated."l31

The Commission, embracing its position on the Declaration, and pursuing
its prerogatives under Articles 60 and 61 should, therefore, have seized the
opportunity to understand the application of the African Charter to indigenous peoples by expressly referencing the Declaration.
3. The Import of Article 60 for Indigenous Rights
The juridical employment of Article 60 to import the norms of indigenous rights into the Commission's conceptions of state obligations
under the African Charter serves a dual purpose. First, this allows the Commission to recognize and advance the rights of Africa's indigenous peoples
under the auspices of the African Charter. The Commission formally stated
that "[i]n interpreting and applying the African Charter, the African Commission relies on its own jurisprudence, and as provided by Articles 60 and
61 of the African Charter, on appropriate and relevant international and
regional human rights instruments."' 3 2 Furthermore, these two unique provisions reflect a broad understanding of their own application, providing the
Commission "great flexibility in the interpretation of the norms enshrined
in the Charter." 33
The Declaration's enumerated rights "constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity, and well-being of the indigenous peoples of
the world." 34 The Declaration-the baseline for the articulation of legal
norms on the rights of indigenous peoples-provides a framework for understanding the Charter rights as applied to indigenous communities on the
Purohit and Moore v. Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001, 1 48, Afr. Comm'n on
Human and Peoples' Rights (2003), available in Afr. Comm'n on Human &Peoples' Rights, Sixteenth Annual Activity Report, 68 (2003) [hereinafter Gambia
Communication].
132 Id. at 1 47.
133 NMEHIELLE, supra note 113, at 161.
134 Declaration, supra note 8, art. 43.
131
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African continent.135 Due to the unique relationship between states and
their indigenous communities, the Declaration is necessary to illuminate
how the Charter's human rights standards must be applied to indigenous
populations.136 The African Commission, itself, recognizes the importance
of the Declaration for upholding indigenous peoples' rights. In its Communique on the UN Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the

Commission stated:
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is
in line with the position and work of the African Commission on indigenous peoples' rights as expressed in the various reports, resolutions and legal opinions on the subject
matter. The African Commission is confident that the Declaration will become a very valuable tool and a point of
reference for the African Commission's efforts to ensure
the promotion and protection of indigenous peoples' rights
on the African continent.137
As stated previously, the Declaration's norms are not out of step
with judicial recognition of indigenous rights presently occurring on the
African continent.138 The Commission's efforts would serve to strengthen
the work of domestic courts supporting the human rights of indigenous persons and provide some guidance to states on their obligations toward their
indigenous communities.
Second, African Commission jurisprudence interpreting the Declaration in conjunction with the African Charter will have a positive influence
on the development of the norms embodied in the Declaration. Hiram E.
Chodosh argues that "the persistent exclusion of declarative law from the
realm of law retards the evolution of these norms and impedes the growth
of a more effective international legal system." 3 9 The African understanding and conception of international indigenous rights will, therefore, impact
'5 See id. at

pmbl. 21 ("Believing that this Declaration is a further important step
forward for the recognition, promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of
indigenous peoples .... .").
136 See Declaration, supra note 8, at pmbl.
19 ("Encouraging States to comply
with and effectively implement all their obligation as they apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particularly those related to human rights,
in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned .
137 Commission Communique supra note 101, at 1 5.
138 See supra note 109, and accompanying text.
139 Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative
InternationalLaw, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 87, 97 (1991).
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the normative interpretation of the Declaration. 14 0 Although the Declaration
is not a binding statement of international law, this instrument should nonetheless be viewed as a statement of norms and commitments of states, applicable to the Charter through Article 60.141 Vincent 0. Orlu Nmehielle
appropriately contends "that the usefulness of Article 60 and 61 of the
Charter depends on the creative imagination of the Commission, as well
increased experience and practice of the African mechanism." 4 2 The Commission, accordingly, should further develop its jurisprudence under Articles 60 and 61, while, at the same time, contributing to the articulation of
the Declaration's developing norms. The Commission's consideration of
the Endorois claim less than a year after the Declaration's adoption would
have allowed it to be one of the first human rights bodies to articulate the
legal meaning of the Declaration's provisions. Unfortunately, the Commission missed an opportunity for the African perspective on indigenous rights
provisions to have a profound impact upon the substantive rights of indigenous populations across the globe.
C.

Kenya's Violations of the UN Declaration

The Center for Minority Rights Development's (CEMIRIDE) Communication on behalf of the Endorois community alleges a host of human
rights violations perpetrated against the Endorois community by the Kenyan
government.143 The Communication especially notes, "The Endorois are a
people, a status that entitles them to benefit from provisions of the African
charter that protect collective rights."'44 The Report of the African Commission's Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/CommuniSee Julia Swanson, The Emergence of New Rights in the African Charter, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 307, 316 (1991). "The first step towards deter140

mining the recognition afforded a norm . . . is to identify an already established . . .
law on the subject . . . . Inclusion of a norm in legal documents and its establish-

ment as the subject of study, analysis, and observation . .. enhance the standing of
the norm."
141 See FAQs, supra note 97, at 2.
142 NMEHIELLE, supra note 113, at 161.
143 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 2; Endorois Decision, supra

note 3.
144 Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 30. Richard Kiwanuka, The
Meaning of "People" in the African Charteron Human and Peoples' Rights, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 80, 85 (1988) (suggesting that collective rights are sui generis in
international law, and belong to "groups, communities, or peoples." Kiwanuka
elaborates, "When the group secures the right in question, then the benefits redound
to its individual constituents, and are distributed as individual human rights.").
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ties recognized that "the African Charter and its jurisprudence relating to
'peoples' concludes that both the individual and collective rights provided
for in the African Charter should be applicable to the promotion and protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples." 4 5
These African Charter rights, therefore, have corresponding rights
within the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Appropriately,
a thorough study of the relationship between all these rights would be extremely useful and enhance our understanding of both human rights instruments. We have chosen to take a more narrow approach and examine two
of the substantive rights within the African Charter and the Declaration the Right to Natural Resources and the Right to Development.14 6 The reason for their selection is two-fold: a discussion of these two rights will
effectively illustrate the importance of interpreting the Charter through the
normative framework of the Declaration; and these rights bear heavily on
African states ability to promote national economic development through
capitalization on Africa's environmental richness, while respecting indigenous communities.
1. The Right to Natural Resources
The right to natural resources is a crucial element of the Endorois
Communication. The violation of this right in the Endorois case is indicative of a larger issue within African states as governments pursue national
development strategies.14 7 Recent history illustrates that indigenous and
minority populations suffer when governments attempt to capitalize on national resources while failing to consult with those communities which possess equal claims to these resources.14 8 The Endorois community has,
Afr. Commission's Working Group, supra note 51, at I10.
See African Charter, supra note 4, arts. 21-22.
147 See Afr. Commission's Working Group, supra note 51, at 41. "In East Africa,
the massive land dispossession has had negative consequences for the cultures of
... pastoralists, . . . . Different religious rituals are no longer observed because of
loss of livestock and game resources, which are necessary for the performance of
such rituals. This has deprived indigenous peoples of their valuable spiritual
practices."
148 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at
7. "Apart from a confrontation
with the Maasai over the Lake Bogoria region approximately three centuries ago,
the Endorois have been accepted by all neighboring tribes as bona fide owners of
the land." See also Afr. Commission's Working Group, supra note 51, at 21. "Indigenous pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities in Africa have been losing
their land incrementally over the years." Examples of pastoralists who are suffering from particular human rights violations are the Pokot of Kenya and Uganda, the
145

146
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likewise, suffered from Kenya's desire to promote national development
through the creation of game reserves.149
The Kenyan governments' creation of the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve in 1974 precipitated the violations of the Endorois community's rights
to natural resources under both the African Charter and the Declaration.o50
As a result of the creation of the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve, the Endorois
were systematically evicted from the Reserve from the mid-1970's until
1986.1'1 The community is now forced to seek permission to access their
land from local authorities exercising effective control over the area.152
Due to the Endorois' displacement, the community was restricted in their
right to graze cattle and lost access to medicinal salt licks, medicinal herbs
and traditional fresh water sources.' 53 Due to these eviction actions, the
Kenyan government denied the Endorois their right to the resources of the
Lake Bogoria region, resources crucial to the Endorois' survival as a
54

people.1
Land and natural resource rights are critical to the physical and cultural survival of indigenous peoples as distinct communities. 55 These
rights are specifically crucial to upholding their communities' long-term ecBarabaigof Tanzania, the Masaaiof Kenya and Tanzania, the Samburu, Turkana,
Rendille, Orma and Borona of Kenya and Ethiopia, the Karamojong of Uganda,
and the numerous isolated pastoralist communities in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, to name a few. Id. at 17.
149 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at In 9-10.
15o See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, 9. The government contends that
the creation of game reserves is an important public policy initiative, used nationwide, to preserve natural resources, including the wildlife and flora and fauna of the
area demarcated. See CEMIRIDE (on behalf of the Endorois Community) v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/2003, 6, Respondents' Submissions and Further Clarifications Arising out of the Questions by the Commissioner during the Merit Hearing
of the Communication, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights. (2006) [hereinafter Respondents' Submissions].
15' See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 14.
152 See CEMIRIDE (on behalf of the Endorois Community) v. Kenya, Applicant's
Written Submissions in relation to the Oral Hearing on Merits, Comm. No. 276/
2003, 5, Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights, , (2006) [hereinafter Applicant's Written Submissions].
153 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at
14-15; Applicant's Written
Submissions, supra note 152, at 11 5, 15.
154 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at
13.
i55 See S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About InternationalLaw, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist
Trend, 16 COLo. J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y 237, 238 (2005).
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onomic viability. 156 The African Charter provides protection for the right to
natural resources in Article 21.157 Article 21(1) asserts that "[a]ll peoples
shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall
be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it."'58
The right articulated in Article 21 of the African Charter should be
understood as belonging to the people of each state. In other words, the
people, not the government, own the natural resources. The African Charter
conceptualizes state governments as "temporary custodians or trustees of
natural resources charged with managing them for the benefit of all the
people in country."159 Article 21, therefore, "provides a basis to argue that
the right belongs to states as well as people without equating the people
with states. A credible case can even be made that the African Commission
156

Id.

See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 21. The protection of the right to natural
resources is related to the peoples' right of self-determination and the right to development. Art. 1(2) of the Declaration on the Right to Development reads, "The
human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples
to self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both
International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to
full sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources." Declaration on the Right
to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 1(2), U.N. Doc. AIRES/41/128 (Dec. 4,
1986).
158 African Charter, supra note 4, art. 21(1). The right to natural resources relates
to Article 14's right to property which states, "The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the
general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws." Id. at art. 14. See also NMEHIELLE, supra note 113, at 119 (arguing
157

that the American Convention on Human Rights' Article 21 provides broader protection for the right to property than the African Charter). He contends that the

African Commission should require "States to adhere to the international law principle of payment of just and adequate compensation," a requirement codified in the
American Convention's Article 21(2). Id. at 120. The Endorois Communication
alleges a violation of Article 14's right to property regarding their beneficial interest in their traditional land, the possession attached to it, and their cattle. Endorois
Communication, supra note 1, at [ 45-47. The Endorois Communication stipulates that a Commission finding of a violation of Article 14's property right provision is not necessary to find violations of all the corresponding rights alleged,
including Article 21's right to natural resources. See Endorois Communication,
supra note 1, at [ 130.
159 Emeka Duruigbo, PermanentSovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of Natural
Resources in InternationalLaw, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 33, 37 (2006).
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on Human and Peoples' Rights recently has implicitly adopted this more
liberal interpretation." 6 0
Further support is provided by the African Commission's Advisory
Opinion formulated in response to the African Group's draft aide-memoire
of November 2006.161 The Advisory Opinion expressed the conclusion,
that contrary to the African Group's contention, the African Charter vests
the control of land and natural resources in the people, not the state.162 This
understanding of the right in Article 21 -by not equating states with "peoples"-avoids the assumption "that the interest of the people are adequately
represented by their state," which is rarely the case.163
The vesting of Article 21's right with the people allows the incorporation of the Declaration's land and natural resource provisions into our
understanding of the African Charter. Indigenous peoples should exercise
control over the land and natural resources in conjunction with state responsibilities under the Charter for the management of these resources. The
Declaration's Article 26 is the primary provision on the land and natural
resource rights of indigenous peoples.M The article states:

160
161
162
163

Id. at 47-48.
See Advisory Opinion, supra note 102, at
See id. at 1T 33-34.
See Kiwanuka, supra note 144, at 97.

1 33-35.

' See Declaration,supra note 8, art. 26. During the drafting stages prior to the
adoption of the Draft Declaration by the Human Rights Council in 2006, Norway

had introduced a proposal for article 26(3) that would have broadened the scope of
indigenous rights to natural resources. The proposal stated:
In addition, effective measures shall be taken in appropriate cases
to safeguard and legally recognize the rights of the people concerned to use lands, territories and resources not exclusively
owned, occupied or otherwise acquired by them, but to which
they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working Established in Accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 3 March 1995 on its
Eleventh Session, Annex I, Chairman'sSummary of Proposals(11th Sess.), 27-29,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79 (Mar. 22, 2006) (prepared by Luis-Enrique Chdivez)
[hereinafter Chairman's Summary]. This proposal would have created broader
rights of access and placed an affirmative obligation on States to legally protect this
right. The proposal would have been extremely useful to communities like the
Endorois who have been denied access to land they depend upon for subsistence
activities.
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1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop,
and control the territories or resources that they possess
by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional
occupation or use, as well as those which they have
otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to
these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition
shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions, and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.16

The African Charter's right is to "be exercised in the exclusive interest of
the people."1 6 6 Indigenous peoples, as distinct communities, constitute peoples within the meaning of Article 21.167 The Declaration's Article 26 affirms that "people" under Article 21 of the African Charter, includes certain
minority groups belonging to insular communities that have not been part of
the majority's development processes. Furthermore, Article 26 must be
employed to understand how these communities can secure the recognition
of the right to resources under the African Charter. The Declaration can be
utilized to flesh out the extent and quality of "their wealth and natural resources when applying Article 21 of the African Charter to indigenous peo-

165

Declaration, supra note 8, art. 26. After Namibia led the African Group to

block the vote on the Draft Declaration in the U.N., some co-sponsors of the Decla-

ration-Guatamala, Mexico, and Peru- met with the African Group to decide on
acceptable edits to the text. Urgent Information for Indigenous Peoples of all Regions, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Report of the Global
Indigenous Peoples' Caucus Steering Committee 1 (Aug. 31, 2007) [hereinafter
Urgent Information]. The co-sponsor group compromised with the African Group
on language submitted by the Global Indigenous Peoples' Caucus Steering Committee regarding territorial integrity. The co-sponsor group dropped the language
so that the African Group would not reopen the land and natural resource provisions for revision. Furthermore, Article 26 was viewed as recognizing Indigenous
Peoples' "territorial integrity over the land they have traditionally owned or occupied." Id. at 5. As a result, the revisions to the Draft, which emerged out of the
meeting, did very little to alter the articles concerning ownership and use of traditional land and natural resources.
166 African Charter, supra note 4, art. 21(1).
167 See Duruigbo, supra note 159, at 62-63.
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pie."1 68 The first step in understanding the quantity and quality of the
natural resources of indigenous populations is recognition of the traditional
ownership systems. As relates to ownership of natural resources, these
rights "often are not conceptualized in exclusive terms, but rather as recognized regimes of shared use and property rights between groups."169
The application of the Declaration's understanding of land and natural resource rights hinges on an interpretation of the language, "traditionally, owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired" within Article
26(1)-(2). 170 According to the report produced by the International Workshop on the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the
phrase is included within the Declaration "as an appropriate alternative to
refer to the base that provides legitimacy to the claims of indigenous peoples."' 7 i The employment of this somewhat vague and ambiguous language
supports the principle that legal texts develop meaning from evolving values and understanding
The African Commission can extend its influence by developing
jurisprudence on the meaning of this language in the context of Africa's
indigenous populations. The Commission should have provided a better
understanding of the meaning "traditionally, owned, or otherwise occupied"
by applying this language to the Endorois claim. The pastoralist community of the Endorois have always understood the Lake Bogoria land "to be
'Endorois' land, belonging to the Community as a whole and used by it for
habitation, cattle, beekeeping, and religious and cultural practices." 72 The
recognition of the Endorois as bona fide owners of the land by other tribes
supports their claim for traditional ownership.173
Determining whether an indigenous group has "traditionally,
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired" land will require a case-byAfrican Charter, supra note 4, art. 21(1). See also Declaration,supra note 8,
art. 26.
169 See Anaya & Williams, supra note 55, at 45.
170 See Declaration, supra note 8, art. 26(l)-(2).
171 Commission on Human Rights, Working Group Established in Accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, International Workshop
168

on the Draft Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 6, U.N. Doc. El

CN.4/2005/WG. 15/CRP. 1 (Nov. 29, 2005) (prepared by Govt. of Mex.). [hereinafter InternationalWorkshop]. States have criticized this language because it is ambiguous. Commission on Human Rights, Information Provided by States, 7, U.N.

Doc. E/CN.4/2004/WG.15/CRP.2 (Sept. 6, 2004).
172 Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 6.
173 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 7.
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case analysis.1 74 Anaya and Williams espouse that "evidence of indigenous
peoples' traditional and customary land tenure can be established by qualified expert and academic opinion, as well as by objective facts that can be
discerned from the oral accounts and documentation produced by the indigenous communities concerned." 7 5
In recognizing a violation of the right to natural resources in its
Decision on the Merits, the African Commission referenced, not the Declaration, but the Saramaka case before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights.' 76 While the discussion in the Saramaka case may have
been useful to understanding Declaration rights themselves, the Commission's Decision leaves considerable questions as to which points of law
were formally adopted by the Commission. The problem with referencing
this case but not incorporating the Declaration is that the Commission utilized terms without fully adopting their meaning. Consequently, while the
terms "traditionally, owned, or otherwise occupied" were mentioned at various points, the Commission failed to flesh out their contours. The Commission specifically failed to define what these terms specifically means for
indigenous communities in Africa.
The Commission should have been cognizant of different rubrics
for the recognition of rights for pastoralist versus hunter-gatherer communities. The Commission's definition of standards-such as community understanding, traditional recognition, and practical use-would help shape
the understanding of the Declaration's language, and, in turn, influence the
global understanding of the Declaration's provision on land and natural resource rights.
The Commission's use of the Saramaka case instead of importing
the Declaration results in much weaker legal protection for indigenous communities. For instance, the Commission cited Article 21 of the Inter-American Convention which allows that "law may subordinate[the] use and
enjoyment [of property] to the interest of society." 77 This understanding is
not expressly present in Article 21 of the African Charter. The Commission's analogization of the Inter-American Convention's property right to
the natural resource claim resulted in the Commission adopting the two
prong test of Article 14 of the African Charter. This test indicates that
rights may be "encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the
174
'75

See Declaration,supra note 8, art. 26.
Anaya & Williams, supra note 55, at 47 (discussing the Canadian case, Del-

gamuukw v. British Columbia, and Mabo v. Queensland, an Australian indigenous

rights case).
176 See Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at 1 257-266.
1' Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at [ 265.
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general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of
appropriate laws."' 7 8 The Commission gave no indication how this might
play in the context of national development priorities.
The Commission's approach fails to address that states "shall give
legal recognition and protection" to indigenous "land, territories, and resources." The Declaration requires legal protection of these regimes in order to ensure that the natural resources are "exercised in the exclusive
interest of the people."' 79 The respect of traditional ownership systems
through legal regimes will secure that states exercise natural resource rights
in both the interest of the majority and minority of the population.
Ultimately, it appears that the African Commission's Decision on
the Endorois' natural resource claim hinged on a failure of both parties to
address Article 14's two-prong test in a consultative manner. 80 A thorough
discussion of the principles of Article 26 of the Declaration would provide
greater understanding as to what constitutes a deprivation of Article 21
under the African Charter. The African Charter's right to natural resources
may, therefore, be ineffective for indigenous peoples without the Declaration's principles requiring legal recognition of traditional ownership
systems.
2.

The Right to Development

The pursuit of national development, as discussed above, is the impetus for violations of the right to natural resources, among other violations
of indigenous peoples' rights.' 8 ' The recognition of the right to development is imperative to understanding the relationship between economic development by states and the corresponding development of insular groups
within the state's borders. The Endorois Communication alleged a violation of the right to development under Article 22 of the African Charter.182
The violation of Article 22, discussed in the Endorois case, is representative
of a large problem among African states, which promote development on
historical indigenous land at the expense of the sustainability of indigenous
communities directly tied to that land.183
African Charter, supra note 4, art. 14; see also Endorois Decision, supra note 3,
at 1 267.
179 See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 2(1); Declaration, supra note 8, art. 26.
180 Endorois Decision, supra note 3, at 1 268.
181 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
182 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at
218-25.
183 See Afr. Commission's Working Group, supranote 51, at 20-21; Laura MacIn178

nis, Game Parks Threaten Africa's Indigenous People: UN,

2007, at 1 1.

REUTERS,

Mar. 20,
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The Endorois alleged a violation of the right to economic, social,
and cultural development.18 4 The Community contends, "The clear violation of the right to development directly interlinks with violations of the
rights to natural resources, land, religion and culture as their inability to
effectively participate in the decisions that affected them stripped them of
the effective control over their land and their life as a community."' 85 A
key component of the Endorois claim was based on their non-participation
in the plans for national development which resulted in the creation of the
Lake Bogoria Game Reserve.186 The Endorois argued that "the lack of recognition of the Endorois as a people has drastically undermined their ability
to participate effectively in the development process of their
community." 87
In addition to the Kenyan government's failure to engage in a dialogue with the community concerning the creation of the Game Reserve,
the government failed to address the Endorois community's continual wellbeing.'8 8 These two-fold failures on behalf of the Kenyan government
stem, in part, from a lack of recognition of the Endorois Welfare Committee
(EWC), established to represent the interest of the Endorois.1 89 The EWC
was refused registration and, therefore, did not participate or consult with
the government on the use of the land.190
Article 22 of the African Charter stipulates, "All peoples shall have
the right to their economic, social, and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind."'91 Article 20(1) of the African Charter is related
to article 22. It espouses that "[a]ll peoples shall have the right to existence. . . . They . . . shall pursue their economic and social development

according to the policy they have freely chosen."

92

Accordingly, the exis-

Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 230 (noting that a finding of the
violation of the right to culture under Article 17, property under article 14, and
natural resources under article 21, would be a strong indication that the right to
development has also been violated). The violations of those Charter rights are,
ostensibly, violations of economic and cultural development.
185 Applicant's Written Submissions, supra note 152, at
37.
186 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 217.
187 Applicant's Written Submissions, supra note 152, at
36.
188 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 217.
189 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 5.
184

190

Id.

191

African Charter, supra note 4, art. 22.
Id. at art. 20.

192
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tence of a group of peoples must be recognized for states to allow them to
participate in their economic, social, and cultural development.
The African Commission's Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities claims the root of the varied human rights
violations against indigenous peoples is that "many marginalized indigenous peoples in Africa are denied the right to exist as peoples and to determine their own development."' 9 A chief purpose of the Declaration is to
"respect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples," and recognition of
their existence is integral to the effective realization of the Declaration's
rights.194 The effective application of the African Charter's right to development to indigenous communities, like the Endorois, begins with governments acknowledging the existence of indigenous communities and
respecting their identity as distinct groups within the state. The Declaration
provides further explanation of how this can be accomplished and is discussed further below.
A more developed understanding of the African Charter's base construction of the development right is gained by reference to other human
rights instruments.195 The United Nations adopted a formal Declaration on
the Right to Development in 1986 (Development Declaration). Article 2(1)
of that Declaration posits, "The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right
to development." 96 Furthermore, Article 3(1) states, "States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions
Afr. Commission's Working Group, supra note 51, at 57.
194 Declaration, supra note 8, at pmbl.
8.
195 In this context, the authors stress that they are not advocating for the express
incorporation of the U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development into Article 22
of the African Charter. We are merely referencing it as a tool to understanding the
right to development as traditionally understood. In this sense, we are utilizing it in
the manner in which the Commission utilized discussion from regional human
rights mechanisms regarding freedom of expression in The Law Office of Ghazi
Suleiman v. Sudan. Sudanese Communication, supra note 128, at 11 39-53. Nevertheless, the Commission could interpret the African Charter with express reference to substantive provisions of the Declaration on the Right to Development.
196 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 86, art. 2. See
also The
Right to Development, C.H.R. Res. 1998/72, 3(a), ESCOR Supp. (No. 3), U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/72 (1998) ("The essence of the right to development is the principle that the human person is the central subject of development and that the right
to life includes within its existence in human dignity with the minimum necessities
of life"). Article 2(2)-(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development further
provides:
193
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favourable to the realization of the right to development."' 9 7 The right to
development, therefore, is best understood as comprising of both a procedural and substantive element: the right to participate in the development process; and the right to a substantive improvement in well-being.19 8
While the Development Declaration furthers an understanding of
the general right to development, the Commission should incorporate the
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into Article 22 of the African Charter.199 The Preamble to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples countenances the procedural and substantive elements, stating
that "control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and
their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and
strengthen their institutions, cultures, and traditions and to promote their
development in accordance with their aspirations and needs." 200 The control by indigenous peoples over the development process is effectuated
through the Declaration's two main provisions on the right to development.
Article 23 grants indigenous communities control over the development process, "to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development." 20 1 This provision is similar in substance
to the African Charter's right to "pursue their economic and social developAll human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for
full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms
as well as their duties to the community, which alone can
ensure the free and complete fulfillment of the human being,
and they should therefore promote and protect an appropriate
political, social, and economic order for development.
3. States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate
national development policies that aim at the constant im-

2.

provement of the well-being of the entire population and of
all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of
the benefits resulting therefrom
Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 86, art.2(2)-(3).
197

198

Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 86, art. 3.
See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 11 220-22.

'99 See Declaration,supra note 8, arts. 23, 32.

Id. at pmbl. [ 10.
201 Id. at art. 23. Article 23 also states, "In particular, indigenous peoples have the
right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and
other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to
administer such programmes through their own institutions." Id.
200
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ment according to the policy they have freely chosen." 202 Reading both
provisions together, they affirm the right of indigenous communities to
make decisions regarding the overall development of their community. The
ability of indigenous communities to freely choose and pursue development
processes respective of their tradition is continually affected by national
development processes.
Article 32, therefore, provides guidance on the indigenous input
into national development of resources on indigenous land. 20 3 The Declaration's Article 32 should be incorporated into the African Charter's general
development right in Article 22.204 Article 32(1)-(2) outlines:
I. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or
use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with
the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free
and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization, or exploitation of mineral,
water, or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and
fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate
measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse, environ-

202
203

African Charter, supra note 4, art. 20(1).
See Declaration, supra note 8, art. 27. Article 32 is buttressed by Article 27,

which provides guidance for the participatory process by which indigenous communities may seek recognition of violations of their rights and potential redress.
Article 27 provides:
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and
transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples' laws, traditions, customs, and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to
their lands, territories and resources, including those which were
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous
peoples shall have the right to participate in the process.
204

See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 22.
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mental, economic,
impact. 205

social,

cultural,

or

spiritual

Article 32 provides for both the procedural and substantive rights to
development. 206 Article 32's general development right relates specifically
to the "use of their lands or territories or other resources," and is, therefore,
textually distinguishable from the right outlined in Article 23.207 The incorporation of this provision into the African Charter allows Article 22's development right to tackle the specific and complex problem of the effect of
national development on indigenous communities. When it comes to indigenous land and resources, Article 32(1) provides that indigenous communities must "determine and develop priorities" for their use in order to uphold
Article 22 of the African Charter. 2 08
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making
to determine development initiatives through representation and negotiation
with their government. 209 In order for governments to uphold this right,
they must formally recognize not only the existence of the indigenous populations, but also the decision-making bodies of those groups. Furthermore,
Article 32(2)'s requirement of "free and informed consent" of the indigenous community gives life to Article 22 of the African Charter's conception
that development must be pursued "with due regard to their freedom." 2 10
In the context of the right to development, the African Commission's Decision was largely positive. Importantly, the Commission emphasized benefit sharing and development that would increase the capability of
the Endorois Community. 211 The African Commission's decision recognized the procedural and substantive elements to the development right. 2 12
Declaration, supra note 8, art. 32. Article 32 was one of the only articles mentioning natural resources that was revised during the negotiation process between
the Co-Sponsoring states and the African Group. The adjective "their" was deleted
before resources in paragraph 2. Errico, supra note 97.
206 See Endorois Communication, supra note 1, at 1 220-22.
207 Compare Declaration,supra note 8, art. 32(1) with Declaration, supra note 8,
art. 23.
208 See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 22; Declaration, supra note 8, art. 32.
209 See Declaration, supra note 8, art. 32(l)-(2).
210 African Charter, supra note 4, art. 22.
205

211

Endorois Decision, supra note 3,

212

Id. at 1 277. The African Commission described the right to development as

279, 283, 296.

two-pronged, "that it is both constitutive and instrumental, or useful as both a

means and an end." Procedurally, the Commission found that consultations with
the State were inadequate because the "community members were informed of the
impending project as a fait accompli, and not given an opportunity to shape the
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Furthermore, the Decision did note that the state had a duty to consult with
the Endorois regarding any projects and "obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions." 2 13 The Commission found that any consultation with the Endorois Community was
insufficient. 2 14
The Decision, however, suffers from some disarticulation. As discussed above, in the context of the right to natural resources, the Commission's employment of case law and outside sources provides little clarity of
the contours of the African Charter right. For example, the Commission
states, "Had the Respondent State allowed conditions to facilitate the right
to development as in the African Charter, the development of the Game
Reserve would have increased the capabilities of the Endorois . . . ."2'1
Article 22, however, is silent on what those conditions would be. Additionally, beyond clarifying the two elements of the development right, the subsequent discussion creates confusion as to what exactly is required of states
to satisfy those two elements.
In contrast, the Commission could have required Articles 23 and 32
of the Declaration as requirements for meeting Article 22 of the African
Charter. Specifically, Article 32(3) prioritizes implementation of its substantive right through procedural mechanisms. The state is required to
monitor the development process, provide methods of redress for violations
of the development right, and to ensure the long-term success of the overall
development process. 2 1 6 This framework for understanding the development right of the African Charter, provided by the Declaration, would provide greater clarity to the discussion. The Commission could have then
plugged in the Endorois claim into its own reading of the Declaration's
Article 32. As a result, indigenous communities and states would have a
better understanding of violations of Article 22.
CONCLUSION

Due to the failure of many African governments to recognize the
existence of indigenous peoples within their borders, national development
has been pursued without acknowledging its devastating impact upon these
policies or their role in the Game Reserve." Id. at 1 281. Substantively, the Commission found that the "Endorois were relegated to semi-arid land, which proved
unsustainable for pastoralism, especially in view of the strict prohibition on access
to the Lake area's medicinal salt licks or traditional water sources." Id. at 286.
213 Id. at
291.
214 Id. at [ 290.
215 Id. at
271.
216 See Declaration, supra note 8, art. 32(3).
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marginalized communities. Recent demand for tourism expansion comes at
a high cost for traditional communities. Indigenous communities, like the
Endorois, Maasai, Basarwa, and Batwa, are being removed from their traditional areas so that tourists may enjoy game viewing without disturbance
by "backward natives." 217 African state governments, however, claim that
removal policies are an altruistic attempt to integrate these communities for
their own "development."
The human rights principles of the African Charter cannot be effectively applied to or realized by indigenous people unless they are given a
voice. The Declaration, cognizant of the unique status of indigenous communities, provides an avenue for indigenous participation. The Declaration
is necessary to the application of the African Charter to indigenous populations on the continent. All human rights are universal,indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated.218

We contend that the Commission cannot fully understand how the
African Charter rights should be applied to indigenous communities without
incorporating the Declaration through Articles 60 and 61. The Declaration
provides the most effective framework for the realization of the African
Charter's rights for indigenous communities. Its use by the African Commission would also provide greater clarity to both states and indigenous
communities regarding the requirements of the African Charters, as applied
to indigenous populations. Furthermore, referencing the Declaration
through Articles 60 and 61 will allow an African understanding of the normative content of the Declaration to influence the international recognition
of indigenous rights.
The African Commission missed a golden opportunity to fully embrace the concept of indigenous rights for Africa. The Commission's use of
Others v Attorney General (52/2002) [2006] BWHC 1 (13 December 2006) at
1 31, available at http://www.saflii.org/bw/cases/BWHC/2006/l.html. The Botswana Constitutional Court recently invalidated state directives to evict the
217

Basarwa (Bushmen) from the Central Kalahari National Reserve. See Sesana Case,

supra note 57, at 1 231-232. Botswana High Court Miscellaneous Application
No. 52 of 2002 (2006) (on file with authors). The High Court ruled: "that creation
of the CKGR did not extinguish the "native title" of the Bushmen to the CKGR ...
[and therefore] neither the declaration of the Ghanzi Crown land nor of CKGR

extinguished the native rights of the Bushmen to CKGR." Id. The Batwa were,
likewise, evicted from the Bwindi-Mgahinga forest in an effort to protect the forest

gorilla, an important tourist attraction. Consequently, the Batwa community is in
danger of extinction. See also WAIRAMA BAKER G., UGANDA: MARGINALIZING
17 (2001).
See Gambia Communication, supra note 131,

MINORITIES
218

1 48.

2010

THE ENDOROIS' COMMUNICATION

111

the Declaration would not have constituted judicial activism because, despite state reluctance to embrace indigenous rights, the judiciary in many
states is working toward the advancement and realization of the principles
contained within the Declaration. While the recommendations of the Commission are not binding upon States, there will soon be an African Court
system functioning on the continent. The Commission could have provided
some valuable precedent to this Court in crafting an opinion that took full
cognizance of indigenous rights and further provided recommendations that
are reasonable and effective. Nevertheless, the Endorois decision stands as
a landmark case for indigenous rights on the African continent and despite
our criticism, will no doubt play an important role in its continuing
evolution.

